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ABSTRACT
AGAINST ITS MODERNIST GROUNDS: RETHINKING CLIENTELISM
Sargın, Ayşe
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Asisst. Prof. Hootan Shambayati
This thesis is an attempt to highlight an arbitrariness and vagueness in the
academic usage of the concept of clientelism. It is argued that these deficiencies in
the usage of the concept arise from a bias inherent to its very definition within the
framework of the modernisation theory's thinking back in the 1950s and 1960s.
Clientelism first emerged as a tool of analysis in the anthropological studies of small
traditional communities. Later it was transported to political science to be used in
the study of the politics of "developing" societies. These societies had institutions
such as bureaucracies and political parties, which were "modern" institutions in
terms of definition but which, functioned differently from their counterparts in the
societies of the West. Clientelistic model was utilised by political scientists mainly
to account for this deviation. Even in contemporary studies, scholars of clientelism
tend to view clientelism as essentially a feature of the non-modern societies despite
studies which acknowledge its existence in societies with various levels of
development. In this thesis we explore and problematise the roots of the concept of
clientelism in modernisation thinking and the evolution of it from anthropological
studies to political science. We also investigate the perception of clientelism by the
students of Turkish politics to provide an example to this bias. Turkish studies of
clientelism are marked by a vague use of the concept; not all similar political
behaviors and processes are identified as clientelistic, while those political behaviors
and processes that are accepted as legitimate parts of the political system in another
society, are condemned as clientelistic in these studies. This thesis argues that this
arbitrary and vague use of the concept in Turkish studies arises from the particular
state-society articulation in Turkish society understood as a cleavage between the
"modern" center and the "traditional" periphery. A study of the state society
interaction in the American political system is provided to highlight the difference
between the two societies.
Keywords: Patron-client ties, Political clientelism, Modernisation, State-society
cleavage
ÖZET
SİYASİ KOLLAMACILIĞIN MODERNİST TEMELİNE KARŞI
YENİ BİR BAKIŞ
Sargın, Ayşe
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Hootan Shambayati
Bu tez, siyasi kollamacılık kavramının akademik kullanımındaki keyfilik ve
belirsizliğe dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kavramın kullanımındaki bu
yetersizliğin, kavramın 1950 ve 1960larda modernizasyon teorisinin düşünüşü
cercevesinde yapılmış tanımına içkin bir önyargıdan kaynaklandığını
savunmaktayız. Kavramın kullanımına ilk defa antropologlarin küçük geleneksel
topluluklar üzerine olan çalısmalarında rastlanmıştır. Daha sonra kavram
"gelişmekte olan" toplumların siyaseti çalışmalarında kullanılmak üzere siyaset
bilimi disiplinine girmiştir. Bu toplumlar bürokrasi ve siyasi partiler gibi tanım
itibariyle modern olan, fakat Batıdaki benzerlerinden farklı işleyen kurumlara
sahipti. Siyasi kollamacılık modeli büyük ölçüde bu sapmayı açıklamak üzere
geliştirilmiştir. Daha sonra yapilan çalışmalarda siyasi kollamacılık olgusuna
"modern" toplumlarda da rastlandığı gösterilse de, günümüzde yapılan çalışmalarda
halen, olgunun, asıl olarak, modern olmayan toplumlara özgü oldugu fikri yaygındır.
Bu tezde, siyasi kollamacılık kavramının modernizasyon düşüncesindeki temelleri
ve kavramın antropolojiden siyaset bilimine geçiş süreci sorgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca,
Türk siyaseti araştırmacılarının siyasi kollamacılık kavramını kullanışları da, bahsi
geçen önyargıya örnek teşkil ettiği için incelenmektedir. Türkiye'de yapılan siyasi
kollamacılık çalışmalarında kavram belirsiz bir biçimde kullanılmaktadır. Benzer
siyasi davranış ve süreçler siyasi kollamacılık örneği olarak adlandırılmamakta ve
başka siyasi sistemlerde sistemin meşru bir parçası sayılan siyasi davraniş ve
süreçler, Türk siyasetinde gözlendiğinde siyasi kollamacılık olarak
değerlendirilmektedir.  Bu tez, Türkiye'deki siyasi kollamacılık üzerine olan
çalışmalarda, kavramın kullanılışındaki bu keyfilik ve belirsizliğin, Türkiye'deki
devlet toplum ilişkisinin "modern" merkez ve "geleneksel" çevre bağlamında
algılanmasından kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır. Amerikan siyasi sistemindeki
devlet toplum ilişkileri üzerine yaptığımız inceleme de iki siyasi kültür arasındaki
farkın anlaşılmasına yardımcı olacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hami-adamı ilişkileri, Siyasi kollamacılık, Modernizasyon
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Clientelism is widely identified as a non-modern political phenomenon with
the pejorative connotations of backwardness and underdevelopment both in academic
and folk language. As such, it is viewed as "undesirable" and the concept often
comes in a bundle with a bunch of other undesirable phenomena such as corruption,
nepotism and favoritism. Occasionally the normative judgments surrounding the
concept are established to the extent of undermining its analytical value, as these
judgments lead to an arbitrariness and vagueness in the identification of clientelistic
political phenomena in academic writings. At the basis of this particular perception
of the concept, lies its root in the modernisation theory.
The concept of clientelism was first developed in anthropological studies to
denote a specific type of interpersonal, face-to-face relationship based on reciprocal
exchange between individuals of unequal status - usually landlords and peasants - in
feudal or semi-feudal and agrarian settings. As such, the phenomenon was identified
as a feature of the social organisation of non-modern settings. It proved to be a useful
tool in the analysis of the structure and dynamics of non-primordial cleavages in
these settings, particularly in the absence of class structures.
The earliest contributions to clientelism in the political science literature date
back to the early 1960s and it was only in the early 1970s that the concept of
clientelism ceased to be restricted to the field of social anthropology solely
2(Lemarchand, 1981: 1). The concept was taken up by the students of comparative
politics in the 1960s to account for the patterns of political association and
organisation at the national level, in the "developing" societies of Latin America and
Asia, which did not conform to the accepted model of political association, namely
the group model of politics. The concept was developed in political science studies
as a "residual" concept to explain the deviations from the group model in the political
and administrative institutions of developing societies which were modern in the
"appearance" but did function differently from similar modern institutions in the
"developed" world.
The theoretical background of the studies of clientelism in political science
was that set by the modernisation perspective which was the then prevalent
theoretical framework in comparative politics. In its extreme form, modernisation
theory held that societies followed a linear pattern along a traditional-modern
continuum in order to get "developed". In this context, clientelism was perceived as a
feature of traditional or "transitional" societies which would disappear with
modernisation. Thus, from its inception in political science, the concept of
clientelism was associated with specifically non-modern political action and
processes, despite the fact that, the concept, after its transportation to political
science, was used to study political processes within modern institutional contexts
such as bureaucracies and political parties.
The study of clientelism has flourished since the late 1960s. Some authors
argue that this can be considered as part of a broad reaction against modernist
assumptions about the eventual move from clientelistic structures toward Western
liberal forms of political development and bureaucratic universalism (Roniger, 1994:
3). For a long time both anthropologists and political scientists had regarded patron-
3client relations as "marginal" phenomena in societies in that they "deviated" from the
corporate kinship groups of anthropological literature and from the universalistic-
bureaucratic and market frameworks which were usually portrayed in political
science as "epitomes of modernity and rationality" (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 3).
Earlier studies on clientelism in developing societies were done on the assumption
that societies follow a linear path in their development and that, as the society got
"developed", clientelistic relations would be replaced by modern forms of
participation. Many empirical studies were carried out with the objective of
understanding the role of clientelistic mechanisms of participation in political
development. Some argued that clientelistic participatory mechanisms would bring
political development in the end by integrating the periphery into the center (see
Boissevain, 1966; Powell, 1970; Silverman, 1970; Weingrod, 1968; 1977). Others
claimed that clientelism did not lead to modernisation at all; on the contrary it
discouraged the development of citizen participation and thus the development of
modern democracy (see Zuckerman, 1977). Nonetheless, in both cases the general
expectation was the eventual replacement of clientelistic participatory mechanisms
with interest-based politics as a result of increasing modernisation in the societies
studied (Gunes-Ayata, 1994a: 20).
Later studies of clientelism reflected a growing awareness that patron-client
relations were not bound to disappear despite the changes in levels of economic
development or of political modernisation (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 28). It was
argued that patron-client relations continued to exist as a central mode of social
organisation in various societies with increasing levels of economic and political
modernisation. However, economic and political development seemed to give way to
the emergence of patron-client ties in new forms. There was a shift in the units of
4analysis of studies of clientelism from traditional dyadic, interpersonal relations with
a single patron to semi-institutionalised triadic relations or complex clientelistic
networks in more organised settings, such as bureaucratic agencies and political
parties (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). The argument was that a focus that was only
restricted to the structural aspects of the phenomenon could prevent the perception of
the changes that occurred in the forms of clientelism as a result of the process of
modernisation (Lemarchand, 1981: 15).
Studies carried out in countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece
revealed that patron-client relations were the central mode of political organisation
shaping both interpersonal and organisational exchanges and the flow of resources in
these societies (Eisenstadt et. al. 1987: 20). In other settings, patron-client ties have
become an "addendum" to the central institutional modes of organisation and
exchange having lost most of their hierarchical and diffuse tones, though still
remaining particularistic (Roniger, 1994: 5). It was Landé who coined the term
"addendum" to refer to the way patron-client ties operate "as additions to institutions
whose deficiencies they remedy" (Landé, 1977: xviii). According to Landé:
Formal, explicit institutionalised contracts do not offer an adequate
explanation of the way a community works because they do not provide for
all the needs of a community or of the individuals who enter into such
contracts. Some of these must be enlivened by the superimposition upon them
of voluntary relations of a more selective, flexible, intermittent and emotional
sort that can give them a vigor not found in conventional institutionalised
contracts when these stand alone. This need is met by the addition of dyadic
alliances. (Landé, 1977a: xiii - xxxvii)
Clientelism is today seen as a phenomenon that exists in societies with
various levels of development. The concept has been applied to various research
areas and in diverse settings such as Nepal, Brazil, Japan, Lebanon, Italy, and the
United States (Lemarchand, 1981: 1). Applications of the patron-client concept
5appeared in Keith Legg's study of Greek politics (1969), James C. Scott's (1972)
studies of Southeast Asia politics, and Rene Lemarchand's  (1972) work on African
politics. The study of Schmidt et al. (1977) drew together the general theoretical
discussions on the concept and a cross-area collection of significant patron-client
studies carried out between 1950 and 1970. The 1980s saw further studies based on
the utilisation of the concept such as the study of personal rule in Africa by Jackson
and Rosenberg (1984), while Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) have presented a
sociological theory of clientelism.
The 1980s and 1990s are also marked with various studies which examine the
role of clientelistic ties in relation to the major social and political dynamics of the
societies in which they exist. Most of these studies acknowledge that clientelism is a
particular mechanism of control in society in that it prevents unrest in the society by
contributing to the material needs of population which cannot be satisfied in other
ways. It is argued that clientelism represents a redistributive and stabilising
mechanism that complements the poor capacities of the state and, as such, from the
perspective of political participation, it appears to provide a viable alternative to
complete exclusion (see especially Caciagli and Belloni, 1981; Migdal, 1994;
Escobar, 1994).
In addition to these, starting from the 1970s through the 1990s, there have
been various studies which revealed clientelistic phenomena in what is called modern
societies as opposed to traditional or "transitional" societies. A large number of
studies carried out in this period showed that patronage and clientelism were
ubiquitous phenomena in countries like United States, Canada and France (for
example, Schmidt, 1977; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand,
1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; and Gunes-Ayata and Roniger, 1994).
6In spite of these later studies which showed that clientelistic phenomena
existed in societies with various levels of development and that, in fact, they were
present even in modern societies, the evolutionary assumptions that clientelism was
essentially a non-modern phenomenon characteristic of underdevelopment and was
to be eradicated with modernisation remained intact. It is the claim of this study that
these assumptions strip the analytical value of the concept of clientelism, as they lead
to an arbitrariness in the use of the concept when applied to concrete cases. We
provide the studies of clientelism in Turkey as examples to this arbitrary and vague
use of the concept.
In the first Chapter, the clumsy transportation of the concept of clientelism
from micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political analysis is
explored. The analysis of this transportation is regarded as crucial as we argue that it
essentially culminated in the perception of political clientelism as a feature of non-
modern societies. The chapter starts with an account of the definitions of the patron-
client tie in the anthropological studies of small traditional communities. In the
following section the particular use of the concept in political science studies as a
feature of government is examined. The third section takes issue with this smooth
transportation of the concept from micro-level anthropological studies to political
science studies. The chapter also provides an account of the root of the concept of
clientelism in the modernisation school. We argue that the evolutionary assumptions
of the modernisation school are inherent to the very definition of clientelism and
despite the decline of the school itself, they persist in contemporary studies of
clientelism.
The second Chapter is on the perceptions of clientelism in the Turkish
context. We believe that this chapter serves as a case study to the arguments made in
7the previous chapters. The Chapter is organised in three sections. The first section
provides an account of the perceptions as well as the alleged manifestations of
clientelism in Turkey. The second section offers a rethinking of the examples of
political behavior and processes identified as clientelistic in the first section. On the
basis of these examples, two points are suggested here with respect to the accounts of
clientelism in Turkey. First, the examples of clientelism tend to be chosen arbitrarily,
that is, not all similar political relationships, behaviors and processes are identified as
clientelistic depending on the difference in the nature and characteristics of the
political actors involved and the political contexts. Second, various political
phenomena identified as clientelistic by scholars of clientelism in Turkey may not be
so indeed. A study of the character of constituency service and the patterns of
interaction between interest groups and political and administrative bodies in the
United States is provided in the third section to point out  that what are claimed to be
examples of clientelistic behavior in the Turkish context are not labelled as such in
the United States. In the fourth section an analysis of the cleavage between the
"modern-centre"-"traditional periphery" in Turkish politics is provided to account for
this particular perception of clientelism in Turkey. Because politics in Turkey is
widely perceived to be a continuous tension and confrontation between a state elite
acting in the name of a self-defined public interest and at the "center", and the
"peripheral" social forces to make room for themselves in the public space, attempts
by the social forces to represent their interests in the center is perceived by the latter
as clientelism.
The Conclusion provides an outline of the arguments made throughout the
thesis as well as some concluding remarks.
8CHAPTER II
THE SHAKY GROUNDS OF THE CONCEPT OF CLIENTELISM
- FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO POLITICAL SCIENCE
The recognition of the importance of patron-client relations in political
analysis had its roots in anthropological studies (Pitt-Rivers, 1954; Campbell, 1964;
Wolf, 1966; Potter, Diaz, Foster, 1967; Foster, 1977; Wolf, 1977).In anthropological
studies the patron-client model was developed to denote a particular type of
interpersonal exchange in small rural and/or tribal communities of non-modern
settings. The concept was later transported to political science by the students of
comparative politics who sought a new conceptual tool to account for the patterns of
political organisation within modern institutional frameworks - such as bureaucracies
and political parties in developing societies at the national level - which seemed to
deviate from the existing models of political association.
Today clientelism is a popular political science term used vigorously in the
analyses of political phenomena in both modern and non-modern settings. However,
the concept is still widely identified as a feature of non-modern social and political
organisation, thanks to the concept's transportation from anthropology to political
science under the influence of a theoretical framework set by the modernisation
perspective. We argue that it is important to understand this transportation and the
theoretical context within which it occurred to be able to identify the modernist
biases that are inherent to the definition of the concept of clientelism and that lead to
9an arbitrariness and vagueness in the identification of clientelistic phenomena in
concrete studies.
2.1. THE PATRON-CLIENT TIE IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES
Hall argues that patron-client relations can be traced far back in history, but
"it was only with the growth of feudalism … that relationships of personal protection
and subordination between lord and peasant came to form a basis for social,
economic and political organisation" (1977: 510). He argues that, under feudalism,
patron-client ties constituted a basic part of the system of land tenure and agricultural
production, and had continued to exist in rural areas such as the Iberian Peninsula
and Southern Italy long after the decrease of feudalism. The Spanish and Portuguese
colonisers encouraged the patron-client system in the newly established plantations
in Latin America and Southeast Asia as it proved useful for keeping a cheap and
submissive labor force (Hall, 1977: 510). Hall points out that patron-client
relationships tend to persist in rural communities that are isolated and that have rigid
class structure based on land ownership which prevents possibilities for upward
social mobility for peasants (1977: 510). 
As Hall points out, patron-client ties were first identified in non-modern,
particularly, feudal settings. First studies of the patron-client pattern in the 1950s
were made by anthropologists in small rural communities and tribal settings.
Anthropologists used the term "patron-client tie" to refer to a specific type of
interpersonal relationship that is usually institutionalised in the form of a contractual
agreement between individuals of unequal status, namely the patron and the client
(Lemarchand, 1972: 103). In the words of Silverman (1977: 296), the patron-client
relationship is
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an informal contractual relationship between persons of unequal status and
power, which imposes reciprocal obligations of a different kind on each of
the parties. As a minimum, what is owed  is protection and favor on the one
side and loyalty on the other. The relationship is on a personal, face-to-face
basis, and it is a continuing one.
For Lemarchand (1972: 69), patron-client ties are
more or less personalised relationships between actors [ie. patrons and
clients], or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence,
based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions.
Scott (1972: 92) defines the patron-client relationship as
a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental
friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron)
uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or
both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the
patron.
As described in these definitions, the distinguishing characteristics of patron-
client relationships are reciprocity, unequal exchange, proximity and diffuseness.
The combination of these four elements are what make the patron-client tie a specific
type of exchange different from, say, friendships which also involve proximity, or
from other power relationships which involve unequal exchange. We will consider
each of these four features of the patron-client tie individually.
The element of reciprocity is important both in the formation and
maintenance of the patron-client relationship since the patron-client relationship
continues as long as each party is in need of the supply the other party provides. The
relationship is essentially based on a reciprocal exchange of different types of
resources - instrumental and economic resources as well as political ones such as
support, loyalty, votes, and protection (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48). According
to Scott, patron-client relations become prominent in periods of rapid socio-
economic change during which traditional patterns of deference weaken and "vertical
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ties can only be maintained through a relationship of greater reciprocity" (Scott,
1969: 1146). He argues that "competition among leaders for support, coupled with
the predominance of narrow, parochial loyalties, will encourage the widespread use
of concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation" (Scott, 1969:
1146).
In a typical patron-client relationship - one between the landlord and the
peasant - the client, that is the peasant, seeks material goods and services intended to
reduce his environmental threats, while he, in return, provides the patron, that is the
landlord, with less tangible rewards, such as personal services, indications of loyalty
or deference or political services such as voting (Powell, 1970: 412). From a
sociological perspective, Powell explains the development of personal ties between
the patron and the client on the basis of the condition of the environment the peasants
live in. According to Powell, peasants live in extreme scarcity. They have little or no
free access to land which is the major factor of production in agriculture. Even when
they have land, the productivity of these lands is likely to be very low because the
peasants do not have access to technology or capital. Moreover, the peasants do not
have much power to cope with both the natural and human threats which abound in
their environment such as disease and death as well as violence, exploitation and
injustice at the hands of the powerful, while their culture in general emphasises
themes of vulnerability and misfortune. (Powell, 1970). In the face of these threats
and feelings of insecurity, peasants develop some patterns of social relations in order
to build some security. According to Powell, patron-client pattern is one such pattern
of cooperative social arrangement along with clan organisations and fictive kinship
relationships (Powell, 1970: 412; see also Foster, 1967: 304).
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Silverman describes the formation of a patron-client tie between a landlord
and the peasant as follows (Silverman, 1967: 284 cited in Powell, 1970: 412):
A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of
money or help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his
aid knowing of a problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further
favors were likely to be asked or offered at some later time. The peasant
would reciprocate - at a time and in a context different from that of the
acceptance of the favor, in order to de-emphasise the material self-interest of
the reciprocative action - by bringing the landlord especially choice offerings
from the farm produce, or by sending some member of the peasant family to
perform services in the landlord's home, by refraining from cheating the
landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing devotion
to him.
The element of reciprocity is what gives the patron-client relationship its
voluntary character. Clientelistic relationships are voluntarily entered into on the
basis of the expectations of mutual benefits (Lemarchand, 1981: 15). According to
Powell, the elements of reciprocity and voluntariness are what distinguish the patron-
client tie from other power relationships - such as relationships based on coercion,
authority and manipulation - which are also proximate and which also bind parties of
unequal status but which do not rest on the reciprocal and voluntary exchange of
goods and services (1970: 412).
Students of clientelism point out that the elements of authority, manipulation
and coercion may still be present in the patron-client pattern. In fact, as Scott points
out, the degree of coercion in a certain patron-client exchange depends very much on
the degree of reciprocity involved in the same relationship. Silva  argues that,
although as a result of the patronage mechanisms the ruling elites get privileges,
these mechanisms function as long as they provide for the expectations of clients
(1994: 31). Scott argues that the client is neither coerced into affiliating with a patron
nor his decision of doing so is the result of unrestricted choice. The needs of the
client tend to be critical such as land to farm in order to feed his family while the
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patron's needs tend to be marginal compared to that of clients. A landowner can get
along  without the loyalty of an individual peasant and his family. Besides the patron
has more bargaining power as there are more peasant families with needs, than there
are patrons with assets.(Powell, 1970: 413). However if the client has valued services
to reciprocate with, if he can choose among competing patrons, and if he can manage
without the patron's help, then the relationship will be more nearly that of equals. In
other words, the degree and the extent of the power of the patrons depends on both
the degree of the monopolisation of goods and services and on the rarity of the
resources such as employment or land, as well as on their importance for the survival
of the clients. However, in case, the client has few exchange resources to bring
against the patron whose services he badly needs, then the relationship is more nearly
a coercive one (Scott, 1972: 94). In the words of Silva, "the fewer alternatives to an
asymmetrical arrangement, the greater the probability of the dependent client
submitting "passively" to the dominating power of the master or patron" (Silva,
1994:30).
Nevertheless, coercion and authority are not part of the definition of the
patron-client tie; and if they become dominant, then the tie is no longer a patron-
client relationship (Powell, 1970: 412). Although the patron happens to be the one
who gets more out of the relationship, reciprocity is a crucial element of the patron-
client tie, especially, when compared to pure coercion or formal authority.
According to Scott (1972: 93),
A patron may have some coercive power and he may also hold an official
position of authority. But if the force or authority at his command are alone
sufficient to ensure the compliance of another, he has no need of patron-client
ties which require some reciprocity. Typically, then, the patron operates in a
context in which community norms and sanctions and the need for clients
require at least a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity; the power
imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship.
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Another significant feature of the patron-client tie is the inequality of the
exchange involved. Patron-client relationship is based on a strong element of
inequality and on differences of power between patrons and clients. Lemarchand
describes patron-client ties as essentially dyadic bonds between individuals of
unequal power and socio-economic status. (1981:15). Hall traces the English term
"patron" to the Spanish patron. According to Hall (1977: 510),
the term 'PATRON' is derived from the Spanish patron, meaning a person of
power, status, authority and influence. It may signify an employer, a
ceremonial sponsor or even a protecting saint, but it is only relevant in
relation to a less powerful person or 'client' whom he can help or protect …
As long as the patron and the client share similar values and cognitive
orientations, the above-described vertical relationship between them is perceived as
legitimate and it often involves a degree of affection (Silva, 1994: 30). In an oft-
quoted phrase, patron-client tie is a "lop-sided friendship" (1954, Pitt-Rivers: 140).
Therefore, besides from their basis in inequality and the element of reciprocity, two
other distinguishing characteristics of patron-client ties are their face-to-face
character and their diffuseness. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, there is a
strong element of interpersonal obligation in the patron-client relationship; an
element often phrased in terms of personal loyalty and attachment between patrons
and clients (1984: 48). They argue that this element of solidarity may be very strong
as in the traditional type of patronage or very weak as in many of the political
machines in modern settings; but it is still found in all of them to some degree
(Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48). It is argued that the development and
maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact
between the two parties. The personal, face-to-face quality of the relationship stems
from the high degree of reciprocity involved. The continuing pattern of reciprocity
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creates trust and affection between the partners. According to Powell, the exchanges
being intimate and highly particularistic, depend upon such proximity (1970: 413).
As Scott puts, "just as two brothers may assist each other in a host of ways, patron-
client partners have a relationship that may also be invoked for almost any purpose;
the chief differences are the greater calculation of benefits and the inequality that
typifies patron-client exchange" (1972: 95). Moreover, in most settings, these
feelings of affection and obligation to one another between the partners are backed
by community values and ritual and they are expressed between nonrelatives by the
use of terms of address that are normally used to refer to close kin. In this sense,
patron-client tie is not only a link of mutual advantage but it is "often a durable bond
of genuine mutual devotion that can survive severe testing" (Scott, 1972: 94).
Patron-client ties are also diffuse in their character, that is they are "whole-
person" relationships rather than "explicit, impersonal-contract bonds"  (Scott, 1972:
95). Scott describes the diffuseness of patron-client ties as follows (1972: 95):
A landlord may, for example, have a client who is connected to him by
tenancy, friendship, past exchanges of services, the past tie of the client's
father to his father, and ritual co-parenthood … The patron may very well ask
the client's help in preparing a wedding, in winning an election campaign, or
in finding out what his local rivals are up to; the client may approach the
patron for help in paying his son's tuition, in filling out government forms, or
in getting food or medicine when he falls on bad times.
Scott notes that the elements of diffuseness becomes crucial to the survival of the
relationship during rapid social change; the patron-client ties tend to survive even
during these times - "so long as the two partners have something to offer one
another" (1972: 95).
In the above definitions that come out of anthropological studies, the patron-
client tie appears as a particular type of interpersonal relationship at the local level.
Accordingly, in the anthropological studies, the study of clientelistic phenomena are
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connected with the study of phenomena like ritual kinship and friendship. However,
later, in political science, we see that the concept is used to denote a feature of
government and that the study of clientelistic phenomena becomes part of the study
of political machines and factions at the national level.
The transportation of the concept of clientelism from micro-level
anthropological studies to macro-level political studies was explained on the basis of
the argument for a transition from a local landlord-peasant relationship to a complex
transaction system at the national level. The argument was that socio-economic
change, particularly, increasing industrialisation and the penetration of the society by
the state, altered the bases of patron-client relationships and as a result, the traditional
resources of local patrons have been supplanted by control over government and
political party positions (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981; see also Zuckerman, 1977: 63).
As a result of this process, the patron became transformed into a broker, with state
and market penetration of the peasant village, and appeared to act as a mediator
between the peasants and the state (Powell, 1970: 413).
At the basis of this smooth transportation of the concept of clientelism from
micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political science studies, lied the
theory of dyads. Anthropological studies define patron-client relations as a specific
type of dyadic - a two-person, personal - relationship. However political scientists
argue that patron-client ties are not necessarily dyadic and unidirectional, but may
involve networks of reciprocities; that is depending upon their position in the society,
one man's patron may act as another man's client. In other words, individual dyads
are linked to other dyads in larger structures and all the dyadic ties within a society
constitute a dyadic network (Mayer, 1966; Lemarchand, 1977).  Thus, micro-level
relationships, dyads, of anthropological studies are used to account for macro-level
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political phenomena such as political machines and factions in political parties in
political science studies. The transition from one to the other is explained on the
basis of the argument for the " stacking up of dyads" to form dyadic networks.
2.2. DYADS AS THE BASIS OF CLIENTELISM
In a seminal essay of his, Schmidt, notes that clientelist analysis, through its
emphasis on informal and personal relationships in the political process, overcomes
the difficulty of describing polities where the study of interest groups, political
parties and voting patterns fail to account for political behavior (1977: 305). Carl
Landé points out to a similar thing; he reveals that the importance of personal
networks in polities became manifest when a group of social scientists were asked by
the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council to
study interest groups in a number of underdeveloped countries within a wider project
of cross-national study of politics. Landé - one of the grantees - reports that the main
conclusion they came up with at the end of the study was that, in the developing
polities, interest groups do not play as important a role in the political process as had
been expected (1973: 103). In a criticism of the existing theory of group politics
advocated by Gabriel A. Almond (1960) and others, Landé argues that in many
developing polities a great deal of "individual self-representation is self-
representation pure and simple, without any pretence of a concern for the categorical
interests of any collectivity, be it society as a whole or a subgroup within it" (Landé,
1973: 103).
Group theory of politics assumes that individuals in politics act mostly as
members of groups. A group is composed of a set of individuals who share common
attitudes that often stem from the similar background characteristics of these
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individuals. These individuals act together because they believe that by doing so they
will attain their common objectives and gain similar individual rewards (Lande,
1973: 103). The disposition to work in groups stems from the experience of people
that is, "an individual … is politically rather helpless, but a group unites the
resources of individuals into an effective force" (Dahl, 1961: 5 cited in Landé,
1977b: 506). There are different kinds of groups; some are primary groups dealt with
in anthropological studies such as lineages, clans and castes. Some others are
organised voluntary groups. There are also groups that are nothing but mere
categories, that is "unorganised groups consisting of all individuals who have some
particular characteristic in common" (Lande, 1977b: 506). The group model of
politics assumes that within the nation there are to be found numerous distinctive
categories of people. These people have formed themselves into associations,
membership of which is sometimes based on mere geographic nearness; that is the
sharing of the same county, town or city; and in some cases on specialised economic
interests or similar points of view. Some of the functions of these subgroups within
the nation interest only their own members while the activities of some subgroups
have an effect upon the larger body politic and affect the members of other
subgroups as well.
According to group theory of politics, individual citizens satisfy their needs
by joining others with similar needs, to seek general legislation that will be of use to
other citizens with the same needs. Thus, the individual attains his particularistic
objectives through his fight for the categorical objectives of the group. This way of
reaching one's private ends by advancing the interests of countless other people
arises out of the fact that individual citizens have no other alternative to achieve their
private interests rather than through a feeling of altruism. There is no other alterative
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because the group theory of politics assumes the rule of general laws; that is, laws
will be enforced rigidly and impersonally to all alike individuals. It also assumes that
each individual clearly knows what her interests are and the categories that she
belongs to; and will recognise the fellow members of these categories in collective
efforts to seek legislation in their common interest, while recognising the categories
whose interests clash with her and refusing offers coming from such groups to
advance their interest at the expense of his. Politicians in the political parties are also
assumed to know which of the categories they should choose among many and give
priority to the demands of these categories while neglecting those of the others.
Individual citizens in return are assumed to figure out which party does the most to
advance their own interests and that they will give their support to that party (Landé,
1977b: 506-7).
Landé points out that one of the main weaknesses of this theory is its
assumption that government proceeds according to the rule of law, that is the laws
are enforced impersonally and that individuals can benefit only through the operation
of laws which provide similar benefits to all that are similar. Only then, individuals
agree to advancing their private interests by working for the similar interests of
others. However, according to Landé, in many developing countries this assumption
is not always true leading to alternative conceptualisations of interest articulation
structure in the developing world (1973: 104).
This alternative conceptualisation for Landé is a "dyadically structured system"
in which the basic structural unit is not the group, but the dyad (1973: 104). Landé
describes a dyadic relationship as "a direct relationship involving some form of
interaction between two individuals" (Landé, 1977a: xiii). Here the word "direct"
connotes personal attachment. This element is important as it distinguishes a dyadic
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relationship from one in which two actors are connected with each other "indirectly"
as a consequence of their similar occupations or of the fact that they are the members
of the same group (Landé, 1977a: xiii). Landé points out that the same two
individuals may be engaged at the same time in both a dyadic and a non-dyadic
relationship. According to him, the difference between them becomes clear under
conditions of change or conflict when the individuals must make a choice between
one or the other.  Landé argues that the vassal of a medieval king and the serf of that
vassal are involved in dyadic relationships - relationships whose effectiveness and
stability are greatly based upon personal attachment - while the enlistee in a modern
army, the Weberian bureaucrat, and the factory worker who takes orders from his
foreman are not involved in dyadic relationships. It is true that personal ties may
develop and even have a degree of influence in the latter relationships as well, but
these relationships are still non-dyadic as the personal attachments are not essential
to the relationships themselves (Landé, 1977a: xiv). According to Lande, the dyadic
relationship can be voluntary or obligatory for both of the members. It can be diffuse
or it can involve specific obligations for each member. It can be between members of
equal or unequal socio-economic status. It can be of a short duration or last a
lifetime. The main distinguishing characteristic of a dyadic relationship is that the
relationship connects two individuals by a direct personal tie  (Landé, 1977b: 507-9)
According to Landé there are two types of dyads; one is corporate dyads and
the other is exchange dyads. In the former, the two persons behave as one, while in
the latter they maintain their separate identities. Dyads may also be supportive or
antagonistic; the main type of dyads Landé is concerned with is supportive exchange
dyads. According to him, there are certain analytical characteristics of these types of
dyads. First, dyads may bind persons of different occupational or class backgrounds
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as well as those of the same backgrounds. Secondly, benefits obtained through
dyadic exchanges tend to be particular rather than categorical; in other words,
exchanging rewards does not mean that each partner support the goals of the whole
category to which the other belongs.  Thirdly, dyadic exchanges tend to involve some
degree of reciprocity, but need not achieve exact reciprocity since the achievement of
the latter facilitates the termination of the dyad (1973: 104).
Landé describes certain principles of dyads as follows (1977b: 507-9):
1. In dyads property is shared rather than pooled. Each partner lends or gives
property to the other, but possession or ownership remains in one individual.
2. The sharing of property and the giving of aid is based upon strict reciprocity in
dyads.
3. Dyads are fragile and their maintenance requires the exchange of favors. Thus,
dyadic relationships must be between individuals who are unalike. Each partner
gives the other something the other; either can never supply on his own or has a
shortage of for the time being.
4. The benefits obtained through dyadic relationships are particular rather than
categorical. The example that Landé gives is as follows: The shoemaker makes
shoes for the butcher in return for meat from him but the shoemaker is not likely
to be interested in attempts to better the butchering trade as a whole nor the
butcher to support a legislation aimed at developing the shoe industry.
The early anthropological studies on the patron-client relationship mainly
identify it as one specific type of a dyadic contract. In his studies of the social
organisation of the Mexican peasant community of Tzintzuntzan, Foster has argued
that it was not adequate to think of the community as formed by a conventional
arrangement of sociological constructs. Foster pointed out that every adult in the
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village of Tzintzuntzan organised his societal contracts outside the nuclear family by
means of as special form of contractual relationship - "the implicit dyadic contract".
The contracts were of a dyadic type as they occurred only between two individuals
and implied reciprocal obligations of the parties to the contract. They were non-
corporate since social units such as villages or extended families of the individuals
were never bound. The contracts were informal, or "implicit" as they do not have a
ritual or legal basis, that is they were not enforceable through authority, but existed
only at the pleasure of the contractants.
Foster argues that the implicit dyadic contracts in the Tzintzuntzan can be
divided into two categories on the basis of the type of the reciprocal obligations they
imply: those that are made between social and economic equals such as members of
a family as close as siblings, compadres or neighbors and friends; and those made
between people of different status.  In the former type - which binds people of equal
status - the reciprocal obligations are complementary, as they are the same for both
parties. The first type of contracts is thus called symmetrical. The second type of
dyadic contract is called asymmetrical since it binds peoples of different status and
the reciprocal obligations involved are noncomplementary, as each partner owes the
other different kinds of things (Foster, 1977: 16-7).
Foster notes that villagers also recognise formal and explicit contracts - such
as that of marriage, and the buying and selling of property - which rest on
governmental and religious law, are registered in writing, and are enforceable
through their authority. However, "the contractual relationship enables an individual
to disentangle himself from the weight of ideal role behavior implicit in the totality
of ascribed and achieved statuses he occupies in a society and to make functional
such relationships as he deems necessary in everyday life"  (Foster, 1977: 26). 
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According to Foster the dyadic contract model accounts for one
distinguishing characteristics of Tzintzuntzan; and that is personalism which refers to
a situation in which the individual distrust the system and relies on personal ties, and
the other is the resistance of the people living in the community to all outside
attempts to stimulate cooperative action for community improvement (Foster, 1977:
27). Foster notes that people of Tzintzuntzan were consistently reluctant to work for
others toward group goals (Foster, 1977: 27). According to him (Foster, 1977: 27),
The [dyadic] model suggests that where a society is conceived as a network
of social relations based on dyadic contracts, in which no two people have
exactly the same ties, there can be no blocks to serve as the basis for either
positive or negative action. Neither is there a unit to serve as base for feuding,
nor a unit to serve as base for cooperative work for mutual goals. The model
is consonant with the atomistic, or particularistic quality of society which an
anthropologist feels so strongly when living in the village.
According to Landé, dyads usually are linked to other dyads in larger structures
and all the dyadic ties within a society constitute its dyadic network. Each member of
a dyadically structured system has a personal combination of dyadic partners which
is uniquely his own. An individual's personal set of dyadic relationships constitute
his dyadic web.  Personal webs can be subdivided analytically into horizontally and
vertically structured ones. Horizontal webs are those whose central individual has
status, resources or power roughly equal to those of his various partners. When they
are political, Landé calls  these relationships as "personal alliance systems". On the
other hand, vertical webs are those whose central individual has greater status,
resources or power than his various dyadic partners have. Landé  calls vertical webs
of political nature as "personal following" and a specific subtype of this type of webs
are patron-client systems (1973: 104 -105).
As such, patron-client relationship is undertaken between individuals or
networks of individuals in a vertical fashion rather than between organised corporate
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groups and they seem to undermine the horizontal group organisation among clients
and patrons themselves (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984 48).
 Landé describes the main characteristics of a dyadically structured system of
political leadership and followership as follows  (1977b: 508):
1) The system rests on the single leader with his collection of followers some of
which are bound to the leader by primary ties.
2) The system is leader-centred rather than group-centered in the sense that it is the
leader that creates the group by seeking for individual followers after he has
decided to become a leader.
3) The bonds that tie the system together are vertical and dyadic. There is little
sense of corporateness, and of group solidarity among the leader's followers.
Whatever group spirit that exists comes out of the fact that various individuals
have chosen to follow the same man.
4) The interests that unite the leader and his followers are categorical. The purpose
of the relationship between the leader and his followers is not the attainment of a
common general objective but the pursuing of the complementary private
interests of both the leader and those of the followers.
5) The relationship between the leader and his followers is symbiotic. Both need
each other. What the leader expects out of the relationship is power and prestige
and what the followers are after is protection.
6) The ties between the followers and the leader are reciprocal.
7) Both adherence to a leader and the willingness to take on a follower are voluntary
actions. The relationship ends if one of the parties does not think that he benefits
from the relationship.
25
8) These systems are dynamic and unstable systems. The personal attributes of the
leader and his wealth are important factors that determine the size and the loyalty
of his following.
2.3. PATRON-CLIENT TIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDIES
Weingrod points out that political clientelism can assume two distinct types:
the clientelism of the notables and that of the modern mass party (1977b). Caciagli
and Belloni make a similar distinction on the basis of the terms "old" and "new"
clientelism (1981: 35). According to them, old clientelism, or clientelism of the
notables, refers to the reciprocal, personal interpersonal relationship between the
peasant and the landlord. This form of clientelism was characterised by "great
inequalities" between patron and client. The deference enjoyed by the patrons
derived form their status as aristocrats or large landowners and it was taken for
granted by both the patrons and their clients as an established fact. The resources the
patrons controlled in the "old" form of clientelism had little to do with the exercise of
public power but flowed instead from the patron's personal wealth.
On the other hand, Caciagli and Belloni point out that the "new" clientelism
rests upon organisation. It is tied to the modern mass-based party, particularly to the
use of the party organisation and public resources. As such, the new clientelism has a
greater capacity to provide benefits to its clients, benefits that it extracts from the
state. In this context, the scope of governmental activities appears as a determining
factor in the extent of clientelistic relationships in a society.  It is claimed that when
the government does not control rich resources, there is a limited role for patrons
mediating between government and their clients (Weingrod, 1968: 393). When the
government scope is broad, and when the government is involved in extensive
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development programs, the role of patrons is particularly enhanced since the lives of
their clients are more likely to be affected by governmental decisions (Scott, 1969:
1153-54).
In the "new" clientelism, the position of the new patron is more vulnerable
since
with the passage of popular deference towards the patron, the days of
…eternal gratitude on the part of the client are largely gone. In the absence of
such intangible reinforcements of the patron-client relationship, the new
patron is obliged to rely more and more on the distribution of tangible
benefits as a means of retaining his following (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981:
39).
In other words, as a result of the transition from "old" clientelism to "new"
clientelism, the psychological character of patron-client relationship has changed.
According to Caciagli and Belloni, the terms of the contract between the patron and
client now rest upon "an implicit element of bargaining: they are subject to
negotiation and renegotiation". This is partly due to the fact that with socio-economic
modernisation and greater centralisation in the society, the patron no longer plays the
role "of gate-keeper, of the exclusive holder of information" on many aspects of
political and administrative life which was the basis of the perpetuation of a strongly
asymmetric type of exchange in the past (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 40-41).
Another factor in the change of the psychological character of the relationship is that
the new patrons, given their socio-economic background - professional politicians
from low-middle and middle-class - do not have private resources which they can
pour into the clientele distribution process. The resources of the new patron musts,
then, all is public. To reach the public resources the patron requires the vote of the
client and the new clientelism as such brings some advantages to the client. The
asymmetry of exchange is somewhat minimised since for the individual, now the
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vote is the principal resource; even the economic benefits that clients are able to
extract from their patrons have increased in certain cases through "the client's method
of threatening the patron to withhold his vote in the elections" (Caciagli and Belloni,
1981: 42).
The below quotation from a Sicilian politician does throw light to the way
clientelistic forms vary through time with political development and modernisation.
For at least fifteen years clientelism has been changing in nature and instead
of being a vertical tie as it was before, descending form the notable to the
postulant, it has become a horizontal one; it now concerns entire [social]
categories, coalitions of interest, groups of [private] employees, employees of
public office or of regional enterprises. It is mass clientelism, organised and
efficient, which consists in laws… and concessions granted no longer to the
individual, but to favored groups…..Today clientelism is a relationship
between large groups and public power (cited in Caciagli, 1981: 36).
2.4. THE TRANSPORTATION FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO
POLITICAL SCIENCE: A RETHINKING
The use of patron-client analysis is largely developed by anthropologists in
the 1950s and 1960s for the study of a specific mode of interpersonal, face-to-face
and reciprocal exchange between individuals of unequal status in local agrarian
settings within feudal and semi-feudal societies. The prototype of the patron-client
relationship was the personal, face-to-face tie between a landlord and a peasant in
which the landlord provided the peasant with various material benefits which he
could not get otherwise, in return for the peasant's deference and respect. The patron-
client model proved to be a popular device in anthropological studies to examine the
social structures based on interpersonal and informal networks of individual patron-
client ties in the villages and towns of non-modern societies. It is later transported to
political science where it is used to denote distribution of public and private benefits
in return for votes in particularly what is called the transitional societies.
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The assumption lying behind this shift of the concept from anthropological
studies to the political science was that the studies on small-scale, non-institutional
political processes in non-Western societies by social anthropologists provided
valuable theoretical insights for the political scientists studying the mode of political
organisation and association within political and administrative bodies in developing
societies.
Studies done by anthropologists on dyadic structures, personal networks and
action-sets at the local level have provided the ground for later studies by the
students of politics on the informal networks cutting across modern institutions at the
national level, such as bureaucracies and political parties in developing societies.
Landé points out that in many developing societies, scholars have found out that
personal relationships play a greater role in the organisation of political activity than
do organised groups based on similar class, occupation or ideology. Even the latter
types of groups in these societies - wherever they appear - often operate "less as
disciplined collectivities than as clusters of personal relationships" (Landé, 1977a:
xiii). On the basis of these findings, political scientists studying the political
organisation and processes in the "developing" societies concluded that the analysis
of the politics of the developing societies required conceptual tools other than those
applied to the study of "modern" societies. According to them this need rose mainly
from the fact that the basis of the political organisation of the developing societies -
dyadic non-corporate groups such as patron-client ones - was different from that of
the modern societies which operated on the basis of horizontal corporate groups such
as classes. According to Landé, in developing societies "while class, ethnic, and
religious cleavage may often explain a portion of the contest for power, clientelism
often illuminates a vast range of political life which is not easily reducible to such
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categorical groupings" (1977: ix).  Landé points out that it is this finding which led
the students of developing societies to refer to the interpersonal relationships -
particularly patron-client relationships - identified by anthropologists in feudal and
semi-feudal settings in order to explain various political processes in the developing
societies.
According to Scott, patron-client analysis provides a framework for not only
the analysis of the structure and dynamics of non-primordial cleavages at the local
level but it is helpful also in understanding the informal power networks that cut
across "nominally" modern institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in
the less developed nations (1972: 92). He argues that the dynamics of personal
alliance networks are very crucial in the national institutions as well as in local
politics; "the main difference is simply that such networks are more elaborately
disguised by formal facades in modern institutions" (Scott, 1972: 92). Similarly,
Powell claims that a clientelistic system serves as an important heuristic device for
understanding certain patterns of political behavior like nepotism, personalism,
favoritism and political structures such as cliques, factions, and machines in
developing societies (1970: 412).
As we have pointed out in the previous sections, the theoretical framework
behind this transportation of the concept of clientelism from anthropology to political
science is the argument for the "stacking up of dyads". Schmidt provides an example
of how the dyadic contracts at the individual level add up to form clientelistic
networks at the national level. His example starts with the account of a dyadic
contract between a landowner and a peasant - the "most classic" case of clientelistic
relations. Mr. Alvarez (Mr. A) is a peasant working in a cattle ranch owned by Mr.
Bueno (Mr. B). Mr. A chose Mr. B as godfather to his children. Mr. A's wife helps
30
out with housework at the ranch. Mr A brings token produce to Mr. B and also
always votes for the National Party of which Mr. B is the local leader. In return Mr.
B helps Mr. A in critical situations such as taking his daughter to the doctor in town
when she was very ill or intervening with the authorities on the behalf of Mr. A's son
and having him released when the boy was arrested and accused of stealing. He also
provides Mr. A with the symbolic friendship with an "important" person which gives
a sense of belonging to Mr. A (Schmidt, 1977: 305).
In this relationship Mr. A is the client and Mr. B is the patron. The
relationship is dyadic and reciprocal. It takes place between unequals and involves
proximity. The exchange that occurs in the relationship is enduring and intense. In
the words of Landé, the relationship involves (1973: 105),
broad but imprecise spectrum of mutual obligations consistent with the belief
that the patron should display an almost paternal concern for and
responsiveness to the needs of his client, and that the latter should display
almost filial loyalty to his patron - beliefs reflected by the tendency for
familial appellations to be employed in the relationship.
As such, the relationship between Mr. A and Mr. B is a prototypic example of
the patron-client relationship initially identified by anthropologists in small
traditional communities of feudal settings. In anthropological studies, the term
referred to a particular pattern of social interaction. It denoted an informal hierarchy -
"a kind of friendship network focused upon influence" and, as such, the analysis of
clientelism in anthropological studies was the analysis of "how persons of unequal
authority, yet linked through ties of interest or friendship, manipulate their
relationship in order to attain their ends" (Weingrod, 1977a: 324-325). However, in
political science, the analysis of clientelism is an analysis of a feature of government,
of political organisation at the national level.
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If we go back to our example, we see that Mr. A is most likely to have only
one patron whereas Mr. B probably has many clients, and Mr. B also acts as a
political broker between Mr. Casares (Mr. C) who is the provincial leader of the
National Party - the regional patron - and several other people like Mr. A. In terms of
the relationship between Mr. B and Mr. C, the former is the client and the latter is the
patron; and thus the patron-broker-client  "pyramid" is created by the stacking up of
many dyadic patron-client networks (Schmidt, 1977: 306; see also Scott, 1972).
As seen in this example, the theorists of clientelism argue for the possibility
of a shift between the "old" clientelism or clientelism of the anthropologists, and the
"new" one, that is, clientelism of the political scientists easily in the sense that the
existing dyadic contracts are replicated in the macro-level through the enlarging of
the dyadic networks, without causing any qualitative change in the definition of the
relationship. It is true that the differences in the bases and scopes of the ties as a
result of the transition from old to new clientelism are acknowledged by the authors
describing the two forms of clientelism. However the question of whether the two
relationships can still be considered the same is hardly addressed.
On the contrary, we argue that only the social contexts of the two
relationships, but also the elements of inequality and voluntariness involved in the
relationship are different from each other in the two relationships. Mr. A has almost
no alternative but to have such a tie with Mr. B. He works in Mr. B's ranch and
obviously he does not have either enough money or influence to take his daughter to
the doctor or to get his son released; so the main link Mr. A has with the public
authorities is Mr. B. In this case the identification of the relationship between Mr. A
and Mr. B as a voluntary relationship is irrelevant. Accordingly the element of
inequality is far larger than the element of inequality in the relationship between Mr.
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B and Mr. C. The social contexts and the norms that govern the two relationships are
also different; Mr. B and Mr. C consider themselves as "equal individuals", while
Mr. A' s relationship with Mr. B is one of deference and both take this for granted.
The perspectives of anthropologists and political scientists using the concept
are different from each other. Unlike the special sense in which anthropologists use
the term, clientelism in the vocabulary of political science has a 'folk' meaning". By
clientelism, political scientists refer to  "the ways in which party politicians distribute
public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support". For the political
scientist the study of clientelism is the study of how parties use public institutions
and public resources to their own ends, and how various kinds of favors are given in
return for votes (Weingrod, 1977a: 324). Thus for the political scientist clintelism is
a feature of government. It is an attribute of the system; studying it does not require
much interest in the internal structure of these relations.
The political scientist who studies patronage considers a formal organisation
while its is the dyadic contracts that the anthropologist deals with (Weingrod, 1977a:
325-6). The major unit of analysis in political science studies is the political party
and the key terms are "bosses" and "political machines", "merit versus political
appointments" (1977a: 324).  According to Key patronage may be considered  " as
the response of government to the demands of an interest group - the party
machinery - that desires a particular policy in the distribution of public jobs" (Key,
1964: 348 cited in Weingrod, 1977a: 324). While for Sorauf (Sorauf, 1961: 309-10,
cited in Weingrod, 1977a: 324),
patronage is best thought of as an incentive system - a political currency with
which to purchase political activity and political responses. The chief
functions of patronage are: maintaining an active party organisation …
promoting intraparty cohesion … attracting voters and supporters  …
financing the party and its candidates … procuring favorable government
action … creating party discipline in policymaking.
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In party-directed clientelism, that is, in new clientelism "clients are no longer
individuals but social or territorial groups which trade off their votes for the goods
and services the party machine provides" (Tarkowski, 1981: 174). Yet, as Weingrod
notes "a patronage system cannot be simply reduced to a series of 'patron-client' ties;
a political party is much more than a set of 'dyadic contracts' " (Weingrod, 1977a:
324). We argue that an examination of the transportation of the concept from
anthropological studies to political science casts light on the dynamics of this
eventual association of the clientelistic political phenomena with non-modern
polities.
2.5. ROOTS OF CLIENTELISM IN MODERNISATION THEORY
Political scientists studying various societies in Latin America, Asia and
Africa came to the conclusion that the accepted model of political association and
interest representation, that is, the group theory of politics was less than explanatory
for how politics was done in these societies. Thus, clientelism emerged as an
alternative to serve as an explanatory framework for the politics of the "developing"
societies which did not match up to the presumptions of the group theory of politics.
The group theory of politics, which provided the predominant theoretical
framework in the 1950s and 1960s for the organisation of political activity in society,
was formed basically on the basis of the development of mass politics in the West.
The advocates of this theory mainly held that political activity and interest
articulation structure in society were based on the activity of organised, corporate
groups that were formed on the basis of shared horizontal ties - such as class and
occupation identification - shared attitudes, as well as the shared goal of obtaining
categorical benefits, that is benefits for the whole group. However, political scientists
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studying the "developing" societies claimed to have found out that it was, on the
contrary, sets of non-corporate, dyadic, interpersonal reciprocal relationships based
on vertical loyalties with the aim of achieving particular rather than categorical
benefits - that is benefits for only the reciprocating individual and not for the whole
group - that constituted the base of political organisation and interest representation
in these societies. Thus, clientelism was mainly developed as a model of political
association to account for this "deviation" from the group theory of politics to the
extent that the features of the clientelistic model was identified more on the basis of
what it lacked  (namely corporateness, horizontal ties and categorical benefits) in
comparison to the interest group model than on the basis of what it itself constituted.
In other words, as a theoretical construct, clientelism was developed out of attempts
to put meaning into this so-called deviation and make it comprehensible on the basis
of how clientelistic model related to (or differentiated from) the group theory of
politics which was then accepted as the proper model of political association.
This mode of comparative analysis was part of a broader approach, that of the
modernisation school, whose assumptions were accepted pretty much without
question in comparative politics studies back in the 1950s and 1960s. First
conceptualisations of clientelism were made on the basis of two principal
assumptions of the modernisation school, those of the linearity and desirability of
development along a continuum, the two ends of which were the traditional and the
modern society. Traditional and modern society were in fact two ideal-typical
constructs that did not exist in the real world; traditional being defined in the same
way as clientelism was defined, that is on the basis of what it lacked when compared
to what the modern was seen to have. The particular manner in which traditional and
modern societies were defined is described eloquently by Huntington (1978: 41):
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Modernity and tradition are essentially asymmetrical concepts. The modern
ideal is set forth, and then everything which is not modern is labelled
traditional. Modernity, as Rustow said, "can be affirmatively defined", while
"tradition remains largely a residual concept"… The characteristics which are
ascribed to traditional societies are the opposites of those ascribed to modern
societies.
Another important feature of the definition of modern and traditional
societies was their basis in the contrast between "modern man" and "traditional man"
(Huntington, 1978: 35).
Palmer identifies five variables on the basis of which traditional and modern
societies could be compared. These are (1) affective neutrality/affectivity, (2) self-
orientation/ collective orientation, (3) particularism/universalism, (4)
ascription/achievement, (5) diffuseness/specificity (Palmer, 1989: 59-62). These
characteristics of traditional and modern societies are in fact argued to refer to the
major characteristics of traditional and modern individuals.
(1) Affective neutrality/affectivity: According to Palmer traditional
individuals tend to be affective meaning that they tend to view other individuals in
emotional terms and under the influence of personal values. The idea of other
individuals behaving in a neutral manner is not familiar to them. On the contrary
modern individuals are affectively neutral, that is disinterested and unbiased towards
other individuals.
 (2) Self-orientation/collective orientation: Palmer argues that traditional
individuals tend to be self-oriented. They have low sense of civic responsibility, that
is, little concern for the general or community goods unless these goods in some way
directly relate to the needs of the individuals and their families. However, modern
individuals are collectively oriented in the sense that they have an inclination to play
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by the rules, to the extent of "sacrific[ing] personal values for the sake of the social
or community good" (Palmer, 1989: 59).
(3) Particularism/universalism: Universalism denotes the uniform application
of the rules to all individuals in the same situation. According to Palmer, the
universalistic statement "all people are equal in the eyes of the law" is a characteristic
feature of the modern society. On the other hand, traditional societies are
characterised by particularism and favored treatment for friends and relatives.
(4) Ascription/achievement: Modern societies are characterised by
achievement, that is, in the words of Palmer, "the granting of status and authority on
the basis of demonstrated ability". It is argued that merit-based recruitment
procedures for bureaucratic posts is another characteristic feature of modern political
systems.  On the contrary, in traditional societies, status, deference and authority are
accorded on the basis of ascription, that is, on the basis of criterion other than
performance, such as language or ethnic group.
(5) Diffuseness/specificity: Palmer points out that in traditional societies legal
and contractual systems operate on the basis of diffuse rules and obligations while in
modern societies legal norms are codified and clearly defined. In the former type of
societies, formal relationships among individuals is regulated by accepted behavior
standards, while in the latter they are governed on the basis of explicit codes.
According to Clark, the contrasts between traditional and modern individuals stand
out more when the political behavior of each group is explored (1991: 75).
Their [the traditional people's] fatalism, their lack of faith in their own
efficacy, and their reluctance to join with others in common enterprise
frequently make them unable to mount an effective campaign to influence the
political system … Modern persons, on the other hand … possess the
motivation, the activist spirit, and the inter-personal and organisational skills
to advance their interests through the political input process … People in
traditional societies … [have] the everpresent intermediaries whose main job
it is to obtain special treatment from the state bureaucracy for their clients …
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In modern societies, however, the task of protecting a citizen or a group from
the adverse impact of public policy falls more into the realm of legitimate
interest-group activities … All of this helps explain, why, in modern settings,
we are more apt to find formal associations, interest groups, and political
parties … Although such an arrangement appears to be largely institutional, it
could not survive for long if the basic personality and political culture of
modernity did not strongly support it.
The theorists of the modernisation school argued that development was
desirable, and all traditional societies were to follow one linear pattern to achieve
development, that is modernisation, in the experience of the West. In the words of
Huntington, "the bridge across the Great Dichotomy between modern and traditional
societies is the Grand Process of Modernisation" (1978: 35). That is, the shift from
tradition to modernity was to be realised through modernisation. Modernisation was
described as a complex process involving changes in almost all areas of human
thought and behavior. According to Clark (1991: 70),
Modernisation is a multidimensional phenomenon, meaning that it is a
process that affects most of the mental structures of an individual as well as
most of the social institutions of which he or she is a part. People do not
become modern only in certain parts of their personality but, apparently, must
make the transition along a wide range of mental activities.
In this sense modernisation is a systemic process; "changes in one factor are
related to and affect changes in the other factors" (Huntington, 1978: 35).  Somehow
all the elements of modernisation "had to go together" (Lerner, 1958: 438 cited in
Huntington, 1978: 36). According to Lerner, it is a "process with some distinctive
quality of its own which would explain why modernity is felt as a consistent whole
among people who live by its rules" (Lerner, 1958: 438 cited in Huntington, 1978:
36).
Modernisation is also a phased process in the sense that it is possible to
distinguish the different levels of modernisation different societies have achieved.
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Societies begin as traditional societies and at the end they reach the modern stage.
The transitional stage can also be broken down to subphases. It is argued that
although the pace of modernisation may change from one society to another, all
societies move through the same stages. In this sense modernisation occurs globally;
all societies that were traditional at one time have already become modern or are in
the process of becoming modern (Huntington, 1978: 36). As such, the process is not
only inevitable and irreversible, but also desirable. According to Huntington, "the
rates of change [towards modernisation] will vary significantly from one society to
another, but the direction of change will not" (1978: 36).
The concept of clientelism was developed by the students of comparative
politics under the influence of this theoretical framework set by the modernisation
school. Accordingly, clientelism - its defining features being reciprocity, proximity
and particularism as opposed to affective neutrality, "civic"ness and universalism -
was regarded as a characteristic of traditional societies that was bound to disappear at
further stages of political development, or as a "syndrome" haunting "transitional"
societies - that is, in-between societies with modern institutions but traditional
political cultures - that had to be eliminated with further social and political
modernisation. In both cases clientelism was identified as a non-modern
phenomenon.
 Despite the decline of the modernisation school itself and the later studies of
clientelism that acknowledged the existence of the phenomenon in societies with
various levels of development, and even in the advanced capitalist liberal societies of
the West, the modernist assumptions that were inherent from the time clientelism
was first theorised still persist to this day. The vulgar arguments for the linearity of
development along a traditional-modern continuum are not as emphasised today with
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consideration for other possible paths of modernisation and with the questioning of
the concept of development altogether. However, the concept of clientelism still
carries with it the pejorative connotations of backwardness and underdevelopment
both in academic discourse and in folk language. There is a general tendency to see it
more as a non-modern phenomenon, as a feature of the traditional feudal or semi-
feudal society than as that of modern settings. Clientelism in non-modern settings is
widely viewed as a natural adjunct of the prevalent feudal relations, while clientelism
in the so-called transitional societies is seen to be a remnant of the society's past
feudal relations lingering on behind the facade of modern institutions. In both cases
the means to get rid of clientelism is put as political and social modernisation. The
argument is that modernisation will replace the traditional ascriptive ties and
particularistic norms - which are closely associated with clientelism in non-modern
societies - with an impersonal bureaucracy operating on the basis of universal norms.
The argument is that the logic of civil society and democracy as such run
counter to the logic of clientelism as the nature and functions of modern
representation are believed to be radically different from the nature and roles of
clientelism (Roniger, 1994: 9). It is claimed that modern constitutional democracies
function on the basis of universalistic standards of public behaviour and clear "rules
of the game". Rulers and contenders are subject to clearly defined rules according to
which they compete for support of the public. These rules are aimed at ensuring the
accountability of rulers through mechanisms for the recurrent change of those in
positions of authority and for the distribution of power in society (Roniger, 1994: 9).
Placing friends at critical places in political and administrative bodies is viewed as
harmful to the institutionalisation of public accountability as well as to a "politics
open to generalisation and participation on the basis of universal rules and to a
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discourse aimed at the protection of individual and collective liberties and rights"
(Roniger, 1994: 10). According to Roniger (1994: 9),
clientelism is seen as defying the modern notion of representation, which
predicates these elements: a system of public rights; a public debate on what
should be conceived of in principle as rights and enjoyed in practice as
entitlements; safeguards protecting the latter from infringement; and a
competitive system for establishing the rights and priorities and for
controlling their implementation according to public rules.
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CHAPTER III
CHALLENGING THE PERCEPTIONS OF
CLIENTELISM IN TURKEY
Turkish political life is widely characterised as clientelistic by various
scholars of Turkish politics. The chief culprits in this state of events is seen as
political parties; both the party officials working in the grassroots and elected
politicians such as ministers, mayors and  deputies. It is true that there are various
instances of clientelistic behavior and activity in Turkish political life. However
many other political phenomena that are claimed to be manifestations of clientelism
are not clientelistic indeed. The perception of clientelism in the Turkish context
serves as a case study to this arbitrariness in the usage of the concept of clientelism.
In this chapter, we argue that the particular of the state-society articulation in the
form of a cleavage between the "modern" center and the "traditional" periphery is
what creates the perception of clientelism prevailing in Turkish party politics.
3.1. PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKISH POLITICAL
LIFE
It is commonplace to argue that clientelism is a very widespread phenomenon
in Turkish society. Mango characterises Turkish society as one in which "the
tradition of clientelism is well-established" (1991: 177). According to Sayari, various
manifestations of clientelistic behaviour such as "the dependency relationships
between individuals of differential status and authority, social networks of personal
followings, factionalism, favouritism" are observed at many different levels of the
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society like the bureaucracy, trade unions, civic associations and informal social
groups (1977: 104). He notes that (Sayari, 1977: 104),
the importance of patronage as a means for either strengthening one's status
or for achieving particularistic goals is clearly recognised by most citizens.
Establishing proper connections with the right people, therefore, assumes
priority in all types of social interactions.
Party politics is where clientelistic tendencies in Turkish society manifest
themselves most; it is widely argued that clientelistic practices have made wide
impacts on political processes at different periods of Turkish politics. A prominent
professor of Turkish politics goes so far as to suggest that  "patron-client ties explain
the rapid spread of party organisations throughout the countryside after the transition
to a multi-party system in 1946" (Ozbudun, 1981: 265). The same author argues that
"clientelism can be said to have been functional for the development of political
parties in Turkey" (Ozbudun, 1981: 265). Others have held that "excessive use of
patronage by clientelistic parties" in the 1970s was cited by the military as one major
cause of the political turmoil experienced then, urging the military to take over in
1980 (Erguder and Hofferbert, 1988: 82).
It seems that many key scholars of Turkish politics agree that clientelism has
a very visible existence in Turkish political life. Not only are there various articles
written specifically focusing on analysing the clientelistic tendencies in Turkish
politics, but also there are many other articles on political participation and political
parties in Turkey that frequently make reference to clientelist relations, particularly
in Turkish party politics. However the definitions and the accounts of political
clientelism in Turkey provided by these studies tend to be surprisingly weak given
the frequency of reference made to the concept.
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The weakness of these definitions of clientelism does not arise from an
incompatibility between the theoretical definitions made by the authors and the
concrete examples provided per se but rather from the arbitrary manner in which the
concrete examples of clientelism are chosen. Students of clientelism tend to be
selective in their labelling of political behavior and activity as clientelistic. In other
words, while one political behavior or activity is described as clientelistic on the
basis of certain characteristics of it, another one with the same characteristics is not
named as clientelistic. This suggests that the empirical studies carried out on concrete
cases are heavily influenced by normative judgments which leaves them with little
analytical value.
Following Lemarchand, Ozbudun defines patron-client relationship as "a
more or less personalised relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or
sets of actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional
loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions" (Lemarchand 1972: 69
cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 250). Ozbudun believes that this definition is broad enough
to encompass both traditional and party-directed patronage. In fact, according to
Ozbudun, "whether of a traditional or modern variety, a relationship can be
designated as a patron-client relationship, as long as it displays the elements of
reciprocity, proximity and inequality" (1981: 251).
For Sayari patron-client relationship refers to a "form of reciprocal exchange
whereby individual patrons and/ or political parties seek to mobilise the support of
their followers in return of assistance and various brokerage services" (1977: 103).
Sayari notes that clientelism functions "as a mechanism which regulates social
relationships between individuals and groups with differential access to economic
and political resources" (1977: 103).
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It is argued that "Turkey provides a fertile ground for the formation and
maintenance of a wide variety of clientelistic relationships" (Ozbudun, 1981: 252).
Various factors are identified to account for the flourishing of clientelistic politics in
Turkey. According to Sayari, clientelistic relations prevail in societies with weak
horizontal ties. In his words, where horizontal group or class affiliations are
relatively weak, one would expect to find “a greater frequency of clientelist-based
social interactions” which implies that there is an “inverse relationship between the
strength of horizontal solidarities and patronage” (Sayari, 1977: 103).  Clientelism
tends to prosper in periods of rapid socio-economic change which causes the
weakening of traditional patterns of deference but not yet the replacement of them by
modern authority patterns - a change which will come with further socio-economic
modernisation. His argument is that in this context vertical ties in the society can
only be maintained by relationships of clientelism until further modernisation will
lead to their replacement by horizontal class or occupational ties.
Socio-economic inequality is cited as another factor in the prospering of
clientelistic relationships in Turkish society. Kudat argues that patron-client relations
are characteristic of stratified societies where socio-economic differences are great
(1975: 69; see also Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58-59).). However, Kudat points out that
the existence of socio-economic differences is not a sufficient condition for the
development of clientelistic networks on their own. Individuals are more likely to
become clients to local notables, if socio-economic inequality is accompanied with
the failure of kin units to facilitate individuals’ relations with expanded markets and
state bureaucracies (Kudat, 1975: 69).
Another important factor that is said to contribute favorably to the prevalence
of clientelistic ties in Turkey is weak center-periphery links. According to Gunes-
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Ayata, after the proclamation of the Republic, the only way to integrate the periphery
with the center and to extend the Western-oriented nation-state ideology and
citizenship to the “village gemeinschaft” was to use the existing notables (Gunes-
Ayata, 1994b: 50). She reasons that the peasants lived in a world in which the
dominant type of relationship was primary, gemeinschaft type of relationship. In the
eyes of the peasants, the local notables were part of their private life as opposed to
the “cold and distant face” of public bureaucracy. The main external links of the
peasants were with the local notables; they showed loyalty and respect to them as the
latter, in return protected the peasants against the “alien” state. In some cases, these
notables were Kurdish tribal leaders, and in others they were religious sheikhs; this
varied according to the economic, ethnic, religious background of it of the region
(Ozbudun, 1981).  However most of the time they were the local landlords owning
varying amounts of land. They often lived in the town centers to be able to maintain
close links with the other local power holders and the local bureaucracy. The
notables formed a link between the state and the periphery and the center recognised
them as agents of the state and gave them access to central power (Gunes-Ayata,
1994b).
Ozbudun argues that the presence of electoral competition also encourages
the expansion of clientelistic patterns. This is so for two reasons; first the power to
vote improves the client’s bargaining position with a patron, and secondly, each local
patron in competition with other patrons running will seek more clients to get support
in the elections (1981: 253). The transition to multiparty politics is claimed to be a
turning point in the prospering of clientelistic ties in Turkish politics (Gunes-Ayata,
1994b: 52). According to Ozbudun, the transition from an authoritarian party rule to
competitive multi-party system in 1946 has affected clientelistic patterns in Turkey
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in two important respects. First, it led to the transformation of traditional patron-
client ties into party patronage. Second it gave way to the emergence of new party-
directed patronage patterns that are independent of the traditional patron-client ties
(Ozbudun, 1981: 258). Gunes-Ayata points out that the development of competitive
politics provided a channel for clientelistic relations in the periphery to develop and
continue in political parties and in other institutional networks at the national level
(Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 52-58). Patrons, by their rise to important positions in the
local party organisations, gained access to new sources of patronage which they used
for further strengthening their authority over the clients (Ozbudun, 1981: 258). It is
argued that the resources controlled by the administration were used expansively to
build up networks at the local level (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b).
Ozbudun notes that traditional patrons assumed prominent roles in the local
organisations of the newly established parties. Rural party organisations of these
parties were most of time founded by the already existing groups in villages and
towns and the party choices of each group were determined on the basis of the
rivalries among themselves (1981:258; see also Sayari, 1975: 123-126). Ozbudun
stresses that
the reigning faction had necessarily already identified itself with the existing
government, so that the headman and his supporters were automatically RPP.
Those who opposed them were thus committed to the DP … This conversion
of existing local factions into local sections of the national parties made
possible the very rapid establishment of a two-party political system in full-
scale activity (Stirling, 1965: 281-2 cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 258).
Thus, in the words of Gunes-Ayata, as a result of the transition to multiparty
politics, "political parties [the DP and the RPP] placed primary group affiliations in a
new context; old rifts between rival families assumed a political character … and
individual loyalties were transferred from extended families to larger configurations"
(1994b: 53)
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It is also noted that, in addition to the existing traditional landowning patrons
at the local level, new brokers who did not come from a traditional patron
background emerged as well. A major part of them were not notables but
businessmen, traders and professionals and were active in local party organisations
competing with the traditional patrons (Ozbudun, 1981: 259).
Ozbudun notes that the transition from traditional patronage to party-directed
patronage in Turkish politics became most manifest with the coming to power of the
Democratic Party (DP) in 1950. Ozbudun describes DP as a political machine, that is
"a non-ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in securing
and holding office for its leader and distributing income to those who run it and work
for it" (Scott, 1969: 1114, cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 260).
According to Sayari " the principal explanation for the popularity of the
Democrat Party among the rural electorate lies in its emergence as a highly efficient
political machine" (1975: 127). According to Sayari, "since their primary goal is to
win elections they [machine parties] tend to be highly adaptive to the local structures
in which they exist, display little concern for ideological consistency or broad policy
stands … " (Sayari, 1975: 127).
It is claimed that under the DP rule, "patronage was distributed through
typical pork-barrel grants in the form of roads, waterways, mosques and various
public works. These were rewarded to rural communities which had hitherto
supported the DP or appeared willing to make a switch" (Sayari, 1975: 129).
Ozbudun describes the election strategies of DP as follows:
prior to elections construction machines were often sighted near hotly
contested or electorally important villages, waiting for a favorable electoral
outcome  to start or to continue their work. Larger communities such as
towns or provinces were sometimes rewarded with factories, which were
called "election factories" by the opposing Republicans for their usually non-
economic locations" (Ozbudun, 1981: 260).
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According to Ozbudun, DP patronage in the rural areas also included a wide
variety of individual inducements ranging from cash payments to agricultural credits,
from employment to solving some bureaucratic difficulty" along with pork-barrel
grants (Ozbudun, 1981: 260).
On the other hand, DP's policy of "vastly expand[ing] the scope of the
government's rural development projects" is cited as another example of clientelism
by DP (Sayari, 1975: 128). Moreover, Sayari notes that, during the DP tenure, "larger
communities such as towns or provinces were sometimes rewarded with factories,
which were called "election factories" by the opposing Republicans for their usually
non-economic locations" (Ozbudun, 198: 260).
Among the accused policies of the Democrats for being clientelistic were
some its policies in the issue of the relation between the state and the religion. Major
ones of these policies were the lifting of the ban on the recital of the ezan (the call to
prayer) in Arabic, the broadcasting of Koran readings on the state radio, the
establishment of religious schools, and the expansion of the budget of the PRA (the
Presidency of Religious Affairs - an institution established as adjunct to the office of
the prime minister that functions to control religious affairs and religious education
throughout the country). They were also accused of their mild attitude toward the
Nurcu tarikat; the rumors were that the Nurcus gave support to the DP (Toprak,
1988: 124).
The Justice Party (JP) which was founded after the military coup of 1960 is
said to be another important clientelistic party along with DP that used state
resources to distribute pork-barrel benefits in order to mobilise voters and to support
local brokers (Sayari, 1976). ). According to Ozbudun, the continued electoral
success of the Justice Party (JP) for two decades was partially due to its efficiency as
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a "rural machine" (1981: 260). As Ozbudun notes, Karpat's study on the voting
preferences of urban migrants illustrated that a large percentage of urban migrants
who voted for RPP in their villages gave their votes to the JP after they came to the
city (Karpat, 1975 116).   Ozbudun suggests that this switch of votes to the JP was "a
favorable response to the short-term, concrete, material benefits offered by the JP
machine" (Ozbudun, 1981: 261). However, he argues, JP's electoral successes should
not be exaggerated; despite its machine like characteristics, the portrayal of the JP
urban organisation as functioning like "well-oiled, efficient American urban political
machines are somewhat exaggerated" (Ozbudun, 1981: 261).
One factor behind the proliferation of clientelism in the 1970s is cited to be
the width of the scope of governmental activities. The more the government controls
economic activity and thus commands rich resources, the more roles the patrons
assume as intermediaries between the government and their clients. Ozbudun argues
that the state in Turkey has always been active in social and economic matters since
the time of the Ottomans and that certain activities of the government are more likely
to encourage clientelism than others. According to Ozbudun, while sectoral and sub-
sectoral inducements such as agricultural price supports, minimum wages, labor
legislation cannot be subject to patrons' manipulations, other services that the
government undertakes, such as the provision of roads, drinking water, schools,
mosques, electricity, irrigation projects, communitary development projects, licenses
for growing certain agricultural products or individual benefits - such as agricultural
credits, employment, choice of a factory or road location - are more likely to provide
more favorable grounds for the development of clientelistic relations. According to
Gunes-Ayata, as state penetration into the periphery increased, agricultural
production became important in terms of national and international markets. State
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intervention in the agroeconomy in the form of subsidies to agricultural production,
buying and selling of ingredients and irrigation programs increased to a great extent.
Thus, access to state resources became critical for the economic success of the
peasants. According to Gunes-Ayata, preferential treatment appeared as necessary to
obtain essential resources, such as credits and fertilisers, and since these were
distributed throughout the bureaucracy, the access to it became very important
(Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 56).
In rural areas, JP's patronage activities focused on the subprovinces which
gained importance as links between the villages and the provincial capitals after the
abolition of village and district units with the 1960 coup. Gunes-Ayata notes that in
this context, a good deal of patronage distribution took place at the subprovincial
level through the local organisations of the JP.
Among the rural patronage activities of the JP, the most important two were
cited to be providing employment and securing credits for the party's followers
(Ozbudun, 1981: 264). Moreover, villagers often sought party assistance in
bypassing the bureaucratic red tape (Sayari, 1976: 196).
Ozbudun notes that JP worked also as an "urban machine" but to a less
extent. In the 1960s, urbanisation was noted to be the most important social and
political factor giving rise to the breaking up of village communities in the 1960s.
New communities were being formed in the cities among the migrants on the basis of
ethnic, neighbourhood, and occupational associations. It is argued that the party
organisations particularly of the JP working in these communities were effective in
creating links between the party and the migrants (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b).
Ozbudun notes that the patronage activities of JP in the cities mostly targeted
the new urban migrants (Sherwood, 1967 cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 260).
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A typical villager arriving in Ankara or Istanbul goes immediately to that
district populated by people from his own village. The local Justice Party man
helps him settle, aids in the problems with the authorities, and functions as an
employment agency or a marriage bureau as the case may be.
Gunes-Ayata notes that
The Justice Party’s local leaders had to reinstate their power
continually through preferential resource allocation. Patronage, in the
form of roads, water, electricity, schools, mosques, and so forth, was
channelled through the party and was the common instrument of voter
mobilisation.  Vertical linkages were established and strengthened, the
party became an important means of access to state resources. These
linkages were important because the state controlled the majority of
credit facilities and because the economy was dominated by state
economic enterprise despite the private-sector ideology of the ruling
party. The various spoils were used to create local supporters in the
periphery … (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 54-55).
Among JP's patronage activities, its relationship with Islamic groups is cited
as well. According to Ayata, the JP formed "direct and lasting relationships with
various Islamic groups, communities and leaders. This involved a process of
exchanging votes and political support for access to public resources and protection
against threats from the state and secular forces" (1996: 44).
After the late 1960s RPP is also claimed to adopt patronage strategies to
benefit from "the political pay-offs of patronage" (Sayari, 1977: 111). According to
Gunes-Ayata this was part of an ideological change; the RPP "adopted a populist,
social democratic ideology, which inspired from the Democratic Party's
antibureaucratic sentiments" (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 56). Sayari cites the party's
attempts to "form party-affiliated peasant unions and agricultural cooperatives and
establish close links with secondary associations such as trade unions" among the
manifestations of party patronage by the RPP (Sayari, 1977: 111). Another such
alleged manifestation of party patronage by the RPP is claimed to be its policy of
"granting substantial price increases for agricultural products" during its tenure in
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1974 (Sayari, 1977: 111).  Similarly, Sayari claims that the Republican People's
Party's policy of granting substantial price increases for agricultural products during
its tenure in office in 1974 was an example of its clientelistic tendencies (1977: 111).
According to Gunes-Ayata, the Motherland Party (MP) which ruled the
country for nearly a decade in the 1980s continued to rely on patronage politics like
its predecessors (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 57). However, as Gunes-Ayata argues, its
style of clientelism differed from its predecessors since the MP avoided creating
clientelistic networks based on the party cadres and preferred to count on a few
influential individuals in the big cities who later became party officials (Gunes-
Ayata, 1994b: 57). She claims that the MP applied a pork-barrel distribution of spoils
in the rural areas; it frequently turned subprovinces into provinces, carried out
preferential electrification of villages and establisher telephone networks.
3.2. PREVALENCE OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKISH PARTY POLITICS - A
DELUSION?
The remark by a prominent scholar of clientelism that "the main source of
clientelistic politics is the political parties" in fact reflects a conviction widely taken
for granted among not only the scholars of clientelism but also various other groups
in Turkey (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 60). According to Ozbudun "clientelism and the
related phenomenon of political corruption led to a marked popular cynicism and
distrust towards politicians. In the popular image, politicians are often portrayed as
unprincipled, self-serving wheeler-dealers" (1981: 266). Gunes-Ayata notes that "one
of the main targets of the 1980 coup was party politics, which was closely associated
with clientelism. The politicians were seen as corrupt, having little concern for moral
principles and being oriented toward competition for spoils" (1994b: 57).
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This section attempts to point out to an arbitrariness and vagueness in the
identification of various political phenomena as clientelistic prevailing in most of the
studies of clientelism. We argue that the source of this arbitrariness is twofold. One
is the selective manner in which the label "clientelist" is used. A study of the
concrete examples of political phenomena alleged to be clientelistic shows that not
all similar political relationships, behaviors and processes are identified as
clientelistic; the nature and character of the political actors involved and the political
context seems to be more determining than the character of the political phenomenon
itself. The second one is the dubious assumption that clientelism is essentially a
feature of non-modern social and political organisation. However, an analysis of the
character of constituency service and the patterns of interaction between interest
groups and political and administrative bodies in the United States reveals that what
are claimed to be examples of clientelistic behavior in the Turkish context are not
named as such in the United States. There is the expectation that there are less
chances of observing a clientelist behavior in the American context since it is a
modern setting; while those types of political behavior, process and relationships in
the modern institutions of Turkey such as political parties and bureaucracies that do
not conform with the ideal typical model of modern society are accounted for by the
concept of clientelism.
The allegations of clientelism directed at Turkish political parties stem
basically from the activities and policies of the parties in three particular issues.
These are the role of the state in the regulation of religion; state budget allocation and
the character of the constituency service. More specifically, political parties are
mostly criticised to be clientelistic on the basis of their perception of proper state-
religion relations, particular public spending and investment policies when they are
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in government and their personalistic policy-making that appears most visibly in the
character of the constituency service performed by the deputies.
In fact, Heper and Keyman goes as far as saying that from 1950 onward the
political parties were very much like "ventures established to promote solely their
members' economic interests", as they preferred patronage instead of "planning", and
"populism" instead of industrial growth (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 262). The
authors argue that since the transition to a multi-party democracy in 1945, the
political elite pursued a strategy of political patronage in formulating their socio-
economic policies (Heper and Keyman, 1998). According to Heper and Keyman,
during most of this time (1998: 259),
… no effort has been made to develop coherent socio-economic policies;
instead, the political elite tended to be overly responsive to the demands of
particularistic socio-economic issues. What passed as "policies" on such
matters were, on the whole, no more than slipshod decisions essentially
motivated by a desire to garner votes.
In all these examples, the basis of the argument of clientelism for the policy
in question is the authors' view that they are policies designed to garner votes. In
other words, the authors identify these policies as clientelistic solely on the grounds
that they are policies to get popular support in the form of votes. There is no mention
of the element of  particularism in these definitions. Particularism is one of the basic
elements of a clientelistic political phenomenon (see Chapter 1: 5). Clientelistic
distributions are particularistic distributions in the sense that the goods and services
provided are not universally accessible. If the goods and services provided by these
policies cited are universally accessible to every one, then definitionally they are not
clientelistic policies.  For instance if the price increases for agricultural products by
the RPP government in 1974 for only certain individuals among agricultural
producers, then  this  policy could be labelled as clientelistic. The fact that a policy is
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designed for the benefit of a certain segment of the citizens in a society does not
make that policy clientelistic.
As we have noted above, the basis on which the above examples are labelled
as clientelistic is the mere fact that the authors view them as aimed at garnering
votes. Not many would disagree with the argument that political parties in
democratic systems are, in fact, should be concerned about their votes since it is the
votes that provide the means to come to power for political parties. So it is not the
desire to get votes that is condemned on its own here. It is rather the level of the
desire to get votes; when this desire is perceived to be too great that the party
disregard the "public" interest in order to get votes, then the authors define the policy
in question as designed to get votes. The problem with such a definition of public
interest is that in democratic societies there is not only one "public", but there are
many each with its own special interests.
Ayata notes that during the single party rule the attempts of the RPP
government to create a modern nation made new and difficult demands on large
segments of the population. The development of a centralised state meant that the
state had to increase its control over many aspects of public and private life and, thus
to curb or replace the influence of certain social groups and political actors such as
traditional local elites and the bourgeoisie. Moreover the reform in religion and
education also adversely affected the power of religious functionaries and
communities who had to give their public functions to the new state institutions
(1996: 42). Not only the traditional elites but also the masses were negatively
affected by the single party period reforms. It is also noted that especially during
World War II the introduction of new taxes and rationing of basic consumption items
peasants met with resentment from the peasants not to mention the new values and
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lifestyles introduced by the state elite as part of the wider Westernisation project
(1996: 42).
The DP appealed to the chief interests and fears of the social groups in small
towns and of rural farmers who felt resentment to the secularist policies (Karpat,
1988: 138).  Ozbudun’s account of the mobilisation of local organisations of DP
implies that however there is enough evidence that suggest that
… not only did peasants and townsmen fail to benefit materially from the
RPP regime, but they were also irritated by the regime’s policies of cultural
Westernisation and secularism. Peasants and townsmen, therefore, had little
difficulty identifying with and supporting the DP” (Tachau, 104). Thus
“peasants and workers did not need to be forced into their support of the
Democratic Party by their patrons; given their destitution and frustration, they
were more than willing to support an alternative government promising new
policies (Sunar, 1974: 86 cited in Tachau, 1991:104).
The atmosphere immediately after the [1950 general] elections was almost
apocalyptic. In Ankara a preacher in the Tacuddin mosque gave thanks to God in  the
Friday prayer for having freed Turkey from the government of the godless People's
Party. Near Bursa, some peasants began to divide up the big estates, and when asked
what they were doing, replied: 'Now we have democracy.' In Istanbul taxi-drivers
cocked the Turkish equivalent of a snook at policemen and refused to obey their
orders. (Rustow, 1979: 98 cited in Heper, 1985)
According to Ayata "from its inception, the DP identified itself primarily with
the countryside, with agrarian interests, and with the rural population" (1996: 43).
DP criticised the RPP regime for implementing a coercive state apparatus and for
being insensitive to the needs and customs of the people. Accordingly, its political
discourse placed significant emphasis on respect for tradition as well as freedom for
business and religious activity (Ayata summarises succinctly the approach of DP to
religion as involving (Ayata, 1996: 43):
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the incorporation of Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of
Turkish politics. Religion, in this view, was a necessary social cement for the
cohesion of society … Emphasis was placed on the idea that religious
commitment and social development were not incompatible objectives, and
that religion did not negate the positivism of a section of the single-party
elite, who tended to present this relationship as mutually antagonistic.
One factor that played a major role in the electoral victory of the DP was its
religious sensitivity as opposed to the “bureaucratic enforcement of secularism of the
RPP. The source of the popular appeal of the DP in the 1950s was the strict
secularism of the RPP which made particularly the peasants resentful of the
government. This and also the economic policies of the DP show that it is not a non-
ideological political machine. According to Gunes-Ayata
Whereas the Republican People's Party was bureaucratic and centralist, the
newly established Democratic Party (DP) advocated liberalism, equality,
freedom of speech, participation, a direct ballot system, and rule by the
people rather than by the state. The Democratic Party sought to provide an
alternative to the oppressive RPP " (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 52).
According to Levi
the tension between the RPP and the DP, which represented two
separate wills were so well disguised that they could be mistaken for
having derived from personal feuds. Ismet Inonu, chairman of the
RPP and Adnan Menderes, DP prime minister throughout the 1950s,
were involved basically in a strong ideological conflict (1991, 134).
       Some of the measures initiated by the DP government on religion are argued to
be among patronage-oriented activity of the DP – that is activity with the aim of
garnering votes. However the liberalisation initiated by the RPP government on
religion in 1949, just prior to 1950 elections are not viewed as such. Moreover there
is nothing more natural than a party introducing measures and policies when it is in
government that it based its election campaign and got a considerable number of
votes from those who believed that the party would enact these policies when in
government.
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Toprak notes that "the strict secularisation program of the single-party period
led to a partial relaxation after the inception of democratic politics in 1946. Between
1945 and 1950, eight political parties were established with explicit religious themes
in their programs" (1988:123). The early years of multi-party politics, particularly in
the 1946-1960 period was marked by the issue of how the proper relationship
between the state and religion should be. The Republicans accused the Democrats
who ruled the country until the military takeover of 1960 of undermine the secular
policies of the Republic to garner votes.
The parties established with the multi-party politics in 1946 brought to the
fore the issue of religion. Mass parties such as the DP and the JP were successful in
getting the religious vote by their more lenient polices on secularism (Toprak, 1988:
125). The JP established in 1961 seemed to replace the DP as the target of the state
elites' attack on the issue of the politicisation of Islam (Toprak, 1988:124).
    According to Levi among the most important factors that accounts for the
electoral success of the JP in its formative years were the support it received from a
number of influential groups; and the pragmatic polices it pursued (Levi, 1991: 136).
In order to win a large number of votes the JP aimed at being a mass party that
represented the interests of various classes, ranging from city dwellers to villagers
and from workers to employers (Levi, 1991: 140). Its policy proposals included free
bargaining between employers and employees with their respective rights of lockout
and strike; a comprehensive welfare program which would include social security
against unemployment, free education and health security and introduction of various
municipal and social services for the slums (Levi, 1991: 140). However in its
economic development program - which was essential to achieve social justice in the
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view of the party officials - the JP strongly supported a liberal anti-etatism and gave
prime importance to the development of the private sector (Levi: 1991,141)
A third source of the allegations of criticism to the political parties for being
clientelistic is the character of constituency service. The personalistic nature of the
constituency service of the deputies and that of party officials in local organisation of
parties are seen as examples of clientelism. Ozbudun argues that "the pervasive
clientelistic political culture led to an excessive preoccupation on the part of the
legislators with constituency services"(Ozbudun, 1981, 266). He refers to one study
of political culture carried out by Ozankaya in four villages which showed that a
majority of Turkish rural voters expect the deputies from their districts to render
them local or personal services (Ozankaya, 1971, 158-159).  "Consequently a very
major part of a typical legislator's time is spent on such services, assisting his
constituents to find a job, to obtain credits, to secure preferential treatment from a
governmental agency, to be placed in a hospital, etc" (Ozbudun, 1981: 266).
Similarly, Sayari notes that (1975: 105)
a visitor to the National Assembly is likely to notice that the busiest sections
of the parliament building are the waiting-rooms for the guests. The "guests"
are mostly groups of peasants from the provinces who have come to Ankara
in search of assistance from their deputies. The help which they seek usually
involves particularistic favors: extension of the deadline for the repayment of
the loan borrowed from the State Agricultural Bank, a permit to go to Europe
as a worker, or a hospital bed in Ankara for a relative who is critically ill.
Deputies spend a great deal of their time trying to secure preferential
treatment from various bureaucratic agencies on behalf of their constituents.
It is argued that party patronage through constituency service has become so
widespread that the primary job of elected officials is seen to be the carrying out of
personal favors for the constituents (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58). According to her
(Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58),
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a new extension has been added to the legislature where each member of the
parliament (MP) has an  office and a secretariat to deal with clientelistic
networks. Clientelism has not only expanded but it has even been
systematised. MPs routinely spend every morning responding to demand
from "voters" … Ministers, MPs, mayors, and all elected officials have to be
highly accessible to re-create the ideology of subservient representatives
ready to react on demand. This ideology of accessibility is so important that
when the True Path Party leader, Mr. Demirel, returned to power in 1991
after an eleven-year interval, he spent about three months receiving delegates
from his party's organisations all over Turkey, giving speeches, listening to
their demands, and making promises.
However, in established democracies, these sorts of personalistic relationship
are also widespread. Members of Congress in the US call this type of activity as
“case work” and find it a good opportunity for incumbents to increase their
popularity among their electorate  (Walker, 1991: 19).
3.3. PATTERNS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY IN
THE UNITED STATES
The aim of this section is twofold. First, it attempts to show that the types of
political behavior by various social actors that are considered as manifestations of
clientelism in the Turkish context are not regarded as such in the United States.
Second, it points out that the types of political behavior and action that would have
been labelled as clientelistic had they been performed in Turkey, are not regarded as
such in the American context.
In the American system, members of Congress have personal staffs assigned
individually to each of them who are essential in helping the members with
casework, that is assisting constituents with problems they may be having with
government agencies. Assistance as part of casework includes various activities such
as "helping with a delayed pension or social security check, facilitating the award of
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a government contract, getting a pothole fixed, obtaining an official publication"
(Mack and Edwards, 1989: 71).
In the US, the president and vice-president are elected by a national
constituency, but members of Congress represent smaller constituencies and
therefore they are close to group and individual interests. According to the Dunn and
Slann, in the face of  (1994: 441-2),
a bureaucracy  (that) tends to establish uniform rules for everyone and
overlook the myriad of individual, regional, and group differences …
congress is uniquely equipped to represent diversity. Because of their local
concerns, members of Congress can balance the interests of a diverse
population against the forces of uniformity.
According to Dunn and Slann (1994: 442),
The legislature is much more accessible to the public than either the judiciary
or the executive … The courts are solemn, the executive bureaucracy is
impersonal, but Congress is open. A citizen may incur tremendous costs in
bringing a lawsuit and enormous frustration in getting a response from the
bureaucracy, while a simple letter or phone call to his or her representative or
senator frequently produces the help needed.
Mack and Edwards note that the members are well aware that the quality of
such services has a deep impact on voters' decisions on election day.  According to
Mann (1986: 239),
Congressmen have always felt obliged to keep in close touch with their
constituents. In the earliest congresses, representatives sent circular letters
back home during their (relatively few) months in Washington. However, in
the last two decades a vastly expanded governmental agenda, major changes
in communications technology. And the ingenuity of politicians have
combined to personalise the relationship between congressmen and their
constituents, and in so doing further dilute party ties. Voters are reminded
about the good work done by their representatives - through town meetings,
workdays, mobile offices, and large district staffs, in the mail and
newspapers, on radio and television. The volume of these communications
back home has increased dramatically since the 1950s.
In the United States members of Congress are expected to represent and tend
to their constituents. Interest groups offer legitimate opportunities for representation.
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They also encourage increased levels of citizen participation. According to Keefe,
the legitimacy of government itself depends in part on the capacity of the parties to
represent diverse interests and to integrate the claims of competing groups in a broad
program of public policy (Keefe, 1991: 34).
Most of the time the legislators do not have time to deal with each of their
constituents. Still in case they are interested in the conduct of the congressional staff
and the legislator they have a relatively easy access to them. Some people may have
personal dealings with their representatives when they ask for assistance in
negotiations with the Social Security Administration or receive information about a
governmental program that might assist them in their business or profession (Walker,
1991: 19). According to Dunn and Slann, "in fact, casework, or the ombudsman role,
is a major part of all congressional offices. A little-known but very important aspect
of their work is the passage of private bills for individuals…" (1994: 442).
Smith points out that one significant factor for the openness of the American
political system to pressure group involvement in the policy process is the fact that
the policy-making system is fragmented as a result of the decentralised political
power structure. Interest groups have many different access points into the system
since there are many decision-making centers in the political system, namely the
Congress, congressional committees and subcommittees, the presidency,
administrative agencies and the Supreme Court (1993: 9). According to Smith, "as
the policy process is so fragmented, and there may be many decision-makers
involved in making decisions on a single issue, they have an interest in attracting
interest groups in order to increased their legitimacy and political support in intra-
agency conflicts" (1993: 9).
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Another reason for the power of interest groups in American political system
is the weakness of political parties and party discipline. Weak political parties rely
heavily on interest groups for funding as well as on assistance in elections. The lack
of party discipline and party ideology allows members of Congress to respond more
openly to the concerns of interest groups since they do not have to follow a party line
(Smith 1993: 9-10). Moreover in the absence of class politics it is argued that people
are more willing to come together under interest groups (Smith, 1993: 10).
This particular character of constituency service in the United States should
be thought as a reflection of a particular understanding of state-society relationship in
the political discourse. Unlike in Turkey, American political culture and the
constitutional arrangements of the American government "actively encourage the
emergence of multiple political interests" (Loomis and Cigler, 1983: 6). Certain
interest groups have “as much influence on the behavior of legislators and
bureaucrats as legislative party leaders, national and subnational party leaders, or the
president (Keefe, 1991: 36). In the words of one scholar, “almost no important
decision is made in Washington without the active, continuous involvement of some
parts of the interest-group system” (Walker, 1991: 1).
Wilson defines an interest group as "an organisation which seeks or claims to
represent people or organisations which share one or more common interests or
ideals" (1981: 4). In a more specific definition by another scholar, interest groups are
described as "organisations which seek to represent the interests of particular
sections of society in order to influence public policy" (Smith, 1993: 2).  It is argued
that interest groups play various roles in American politics. The foremost one is that
they "represent" their constituents before government, that is, they work as a
fundamental link between citizens and the government by means of which the
64
member citizens voice their opinions to the government (Berry, 1989). Walker points
out that this function of interest groups is very significant since legislating in
American democracy has in fact become “a highly specialised, full-time job” (1991:
19). According to him "most citizens would not be able to comprehend the
information generated by the congressional staff, and even if they could, there is little
reason to think it would interest them. People have better things to do" (1991: 19).
Interest groups also function as institutions that "educate" the public about
political issues. Although on a political issue under discussion the concerned interest
groups may tend to present the facts and interpretations that are most favorable to
their positions, the exchange of information that stems out of the dialogue among
themselves and with the government provide for a political atmosphere of rigorous
public discussion which contributes positively to ta participatory democracy.
A related role of interest groups is agenda building which enables them to
turn the otherwise specific concerns of their constituencies into public issues. After
the government decided to deal with a political issue of concern to an interest group,
the latter acts as a "program monitor" closely following the policies carried out and
the programs implemented on the issue to check if they have any shortcomings.
Walker notes that
the interest group system provides a mechanism in an increasingly complex
society through which emerging issues and ideas can be offered up as
possible new items on the national political agenda. When interest groups
begin to attract resources and attention to their causes, the parties are forced
to alter their programs and reformulate their supporting coalitions to
accommodate to shifts in the public’s principal concerns (Walker, 1991: 14).
In order to voice and press for their opinions interest groups make use of
various tactics. The primary ones of such tactics are educating the public by
disseminating research and/or by initiating a public relations campaign as
advertisement in the newspapers and magazines; demonstrations; keeping voting
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scorecards and lobbying. These strategies can be thought of in two categories: one is
insider strategies and the other is outsider strategies. Lobbying and keeping voting
scorecards are the main insider strategies while staging public rallies and
demonstrations fall under the category of outsider strategies.
Among the tactics of interest groups what particularly concerns the purposes
of this thesis is lobbying. According to Mack and Edwards, lobbying performs three
important functions that are "essential to the proper functioning of government and
democracy" The first one is providing means for the resolution of conflicts. The
second is funnelling data, analysis and opinion to the government on public issues in
order to facilitate balanced decision-making. According to Mack and Edwards, "no
legislator, no government agency can possibly have all the information needed to
make sound public policy decisions. But the affected interests do … Indeed
legislators frequently solicit information from interest groups and their
representatives" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 8).   The third one is that of creating a
system of checks and balances between competing interest groups (Mack and
Edwards, 1989: 6). According to Mack and Edwards, "because interest groups and
their lobbyists generally play adversial roles on particular issues, they tend to act as a
rein on each other, preventing any single interest from getting too powerful for too
long" (1989: 8).
Lobbying "involves the advocacy, either by individuals or by groups, of a
point of view - the expression of an interest that is affected, actually or potentially,
by the affairs of government" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 2). The practice of
lobbying includes activities such as campaigns to mobilise constituents at the
grassroots and political fundraising programs, etc. Direct lobbying, in the words of
Mack and Edwards, refers to "the traditional form of personal persuasion [as such it]
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commonly and typically involves personal, face-to-face communications" (Mack and
Edwards, 1989: 63).
Berry notes that members of Congress do not limit themselves to meeting
with professional lobbyists but they spend a lot of time meeting with a broad range of
constituents during their frequent trips in their districts. Interest groups also arrange
meetings with the members of Congress during such visits. According to Berry,
"activism by rank-and-file citizens adds to the effectiveness of a lobbying campaign
by demonstrating to policymakers that people are truly concerned about an issue that
they want to see what policy actions are going to be taken" (1989: 116).Effective
grassroots lobbying include "spontaneous" letters from constituents, constituent
phone calls and computer-based direct mail campaigns (Loomis, 1983: 185). In fact,
Berry notes that  (1989:112)
For lobbyists, members' letters and phone calls legitimise their activities. One
business lobbyist stated simply, "My entree comes because I represent the
people back home." When letters and phone calls come into the
congressman's office, the role of the lobbyist is enhanced and their access is
likely to be greater than normal.
The US Chamber of Commerce is cited one of the strong lobbies, which
effectively performs many grassroots operations. On one occasion, it is claimed that
the Chamber succeeded in getting four sympathetic House members named to a
conference committee as a result of a successful grassroots campaign. To be able to
affect the outcome of a critical procedural decision in Congress affecting legislation
on accounting practices, the Chamber urged its members in four particular
congressional districts to contact House Ways and Means Chairman and to request
that he appoint their representatives as conferees (Loomis, 1983: 179).
Personal encounter with the legislator is one of the most effective tactics
lobbyists use. Here the lobbyist finds an opportunity to present his group's case in
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person. The impression they create about themselves is important, since it increases
their credit. Personal relationships with the legislators usually begin at the staff level
since committee staffers are more accessible than the representatives and the senators
themselves. They can directly put lobbyists' ideas into drafts of legislation or bring
them into the attention of their bosses (Berry, 1989: 141). Moreover, for lobbyists
maintaining close links with government officials is important. An official working
for ITT wrote (cited in Wilson, 1981: 113):
There are several executive departments which are important to ITT and
therefore contacts have to be maintained … I spend at least two nights a week
with government personnel. These evenings include socialising, arranging
and attending parties, attending sports events and other functions. Weekends
are usually spent with Hill personnel.
According to Wilson these meetings create an atmosphere of "trust and
bonhomie which  are of help to the company" (1981: 113).
Bureaucracies are usually thought to benefit from interest groups in two main
ways; for one thing, interest groups supply the bureaucracy with detailed information
and useful advice on an issue area. Second, bureaucracies need the interest groups to
provide "consents" to the former's policies (1981: 126). According to Wilson a
second feature of the relationship between lobbyists and legislators is that legislators
need technical guidance from lobbyists (1981: 114). A liberal Democrat, Senator
Metcalf described this need in the following words (cited in Wilson, 1981:114):
I want to say to you that as one legislator for almost three decades now, that I
use the services of lobbyists in my activities more than lobbyists come and
see me. One of my favorite lobbyists is the Montana Power Co. I do not think
that anyone would say I am subservient to the Montana Power Co., but when
I want some information I go [to] the Montana Power Co.'s lobbyist who is
here in Washington and ask him if he could find it out for me. With all
justice, they have never given me false information. Another favorite lobbyist
of mine is the Anaconda Copper Mining Co. Every time I go to the Anaconda
Copper Mining people for information, they give me the information I desire.
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The importance of personalised relationships is acknowledged by the interest
groups themselves. Loomis notes that  (1983: 180)
many of the Chamber's [i.e.US Chamber of Commerce] activities come from
the ranks of more than 2700 Congressional Action Committees (CACs). The
business-men/women who serve on these locally based committees of the
national organisation ordinarily know their member of Congress fairly well
and have some expectation of receiving a sympathetic hearing from them.
Such a personal approach is a hallmark of Chamber strategy; the ties of
friendship or past association can count a great deal when a member must
decide whom to listen to … Directly related to the CAC strategy is the US
Chamber's use of so-called 'key resource personnel' who, according to the
Chamber, possess excellent personal access to their legislators.
3.4.  STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONS IN TURKEY
Various scholars of Turkish politics have stressed that Turkish politics is
characterised by a tradition of strong state vis-à-vis weak periphery inherited from
the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 1985; see also Mardin, 1975). Heper traces the origins
of this state tradition to the patrimonial roots of the Ottoman Empire. According to
him, contrary to the political experience in countries such as France and Germany,
there was no estate tradition in the Ottoman Empire which constituted a
"countervailing" power against the ruler (Heper, 1988). He points out that in France
and Germany central authority was efficiently restrained  by countervailing powers,
whereas in patrimonial Ottoman society  "the periphery is almost totally subdued by
the centre … [which] …  on its own  set the norms of the polity … keeping
everybody in its place and protecting the subjects" (Heper, 1985: 14-15). Thus the
Ottoman political culture was characterised by an "ever-present tension … [which]
derived from the bureaucratic centre's nervousness toward the periphery and the
periphery's effort to circumvent the centre whenever it could" (Heper, 1985: 16).
This cleavage between the center and the periphery continued during the
Republican period. The bureaucratic elite of the Republic, like that of the Ottoman
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period, kept on to view the state as critical for maintaining the community (Heper,
1985: 16).  Heper points out that when Ataturk abolished dynastic sovereignty, what
he wanted to put in place was national and not popular sovereignty (Heper, 1985:
49). People would have sovereignty only when they have become "civilised".
According to Ataturk, reforms needed to be imposed from above since "when the
people are not educated they can easily be won over for all kinds of undesirable
ends" (cited in Heper, 1985: 50). In the words of Heper, Ataturk held that "consulting
public opinion really amounted to shaping it". According to Ataturk "a republic was
a regime based on virtue" (Heper, 1985: 60). Public policy was not to be the outcome
of an aggregation of interests but that of a search for "truth", and the state was "not to
express the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, but rather to add to them more
mature thoughts" (Heper, 1985: 50)
According to Dodd the approach of Edmund Burke may be helpful in
understanding Ataturk’s attitudes towards political parties. Dodd notes that Burke
views party as composed of not of “delegates” but of “representatives who think of
themselves as “having a right to manage affairs as they thought appropriate in the
interests of the country”. Edmund Burke defined party as  "a body of men united for
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular on
which they are all agreed" (cited in Dodd, 1991: 24). For Dodd, Burke’s definition, is
"highminded" and it is supposed to promote the national interest and leans on
principle without particular concern for responsiveness (1991: 25).
Accordingly, for Ataturk, the Republican People’s Party "was not a party
which engaged in everyday street politics, as was the case in other countries". Rather
its task was “enlightenment” and "guidance" (cited in Heper, 1991: 28). He once said
that the existence of parties devoting particular political viewpoints was important
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for promoting a clash of ideas: however these parties should not be like the old ones
whose programs did not relate to national interests. (cited in Heper, 1991: 28).
According to Ataturk ‘the party would be a school for the nation”. The RPP
according to Ataturk was a "no-nonsense" party; it was not to act in the manner that
would "please everybody" but instead to uphold "truths that would elevate the nation
to higher levels of civilisation" (1985: 52).
Heper notes that "they have nevertheless continued to think that 'politicians
cannot be trusted'" (Heper, 1985: 72). Heper argues that for the post-Ataturk
bureaucratic intelligentsia "the elitism in Ataturkist thought was not a means but an
end; it was not taken as a means to bring about an instrumental in place of a
transcendental polity" (Heper, 1985: 72). According to them, politics should be
guided by ideas instead of interest. Politics should not be an activity of providing
benefits to certain social groups. They believed that politics led by intellectuals will
be based on well-formulated, sound and rational ideas rather than "the push and pull
of everyday politics" ((Heper, 1985: 77-79).
It is clear that the post-Ataturk bureaucratic intelligentsia in Turkey did not
have a conception of public interest that would be shaped as a result of
competitive process … The [bureaucratic] intelligentsia in question were also
completely opposed to any concept of public interest which was identified
with the specific interest of a class, or even of economic groups was readily
labelled as selfish. The bureaucratic intelligentsia instead nurtured a
conception of public interest that was identified with certain norms and
values  (Heper, 1985: 81-82).
Heper argues that "the bureaucratic intelligentsia of the early 1960s … were
after reviving a 'moral society' in place of an 'interest society', which in their opinion
had drifted to extreme instrumentalism … [meaning] a society that did not heed the
bureaucratised version of Ataturkism" (1985: 87).
        With their concept of rationalist democracy, the state elites expected the party
elites to give priority to the general interest as defined by the state elites themselves.
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Still according to Heper, the post-Ataturk bureaucratic elite expected “an unrealistic
degree of idealism and statesmanlike” behavior from the party elites. According to
them public policy had to be determined on the basis of "rational" criteria however
they accused politicians of trying to garner votes "articulating" and not "aggregating"
interests (Heper, 1985: 82). Such attempts to create political party elites who were
more attentive to "responsible leadership" rather than to "being responsive to the
society" were outcomes of the idea of rationalist democracy which prevailed among
the state elites. The notion of rationalist democracy as it is adopted in Turkey
regarded democracy as “ an intellectual debate with the intention of determining the
best policy, and not as an effort to reconcile and aggregate different views and
interests”.
Accordingly, as Heper stresses, the opening up of the Turkish political system
in mid-1940s was not coupled with a confrontation among different socio-economic
groups or one between the central authority and powerful local forces, that is through
the mechanism of "politics". Rather, it “evinced a configuration comprising, on the
one hand, the state elites who posed as guardians of Ataturkism as they themselves
interpreted it, and on the other hand, a not well-organised periphery” (Heper, 1988:
5). Thus it will not be altogether wrong to say that, since its inception in 1946, the
history of multiparty politics in Turkey is marked by an endless confrontation
between the state elites who imposed the integrity of the state over the particularistic
demands of the periphery and various peripheral groups which attempted to carve a
space for representing themselves in the public sphere – a confrontation marked by
frequent crises that led to three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980.  The
military was sensitive to assert the “state” over “politics” after each constitutional
and institutional arrangement undertaken after the interventions.
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            Tachau’s account of how the members of the RPP – a minority party
throughout the 1950s – viewed the DP party organisation and its electoral success
may throw light to the discursive background behind the widespread perceptions of
DP as a clientelistic party by most scholars of clientelism in Turkey. According to
Tachau, the explanation that RPP partisans provided for their electoral failure against
the DP was that the RPP no longer appealed to the less educated peasant voters with
its insistence on reform and secularism. As Tachau puts it, in their view, “the Turkish
electorate was divided into two mutually hostile camps, one enlightened, progressive,
civic-minded and altruistic, the other uneducated, parochial and led by an
unscrupulous self-interested elite willing to cater to the most obscurantist and
reactionary sentiments among the masses” (Tachau, 1991: 105). According to the
intellectuals, during the DP rule "politics is no longer an activity to get the most
votes in order to formulate and implement policies in accordance with a
philosophical view. It has become a process to promote the personal, individual and
private interests" (cited in Heper, 1985).
            According to Levi, since the decision to introduce multiparty politics to
Turkey is taken from above, the state party RPP saw its introduction "almost of its
volition" (1991: 144). In the single party years, politics did not have a separate
sphere but were controlled by the representatives of the state. Politicians, from the
beginning of the multi-party politics, acted as the representatives of the periphery's
demands. According to Evin, "the period of the Democrat Party rule between 1950
and 1960 witnessed a transition of the governing elite from the realm of the state to
the realm of politics" (Evin, 1988: 205).
Starting from the 1950s the center has began to be characterised by a “cultural
heterogeneity” as a result of the “infiltration” of the peripheral forces into the centre.
73
He notes, particularly, after the 1960s public bureaucracy was composed of political
elites who were of different backgrounds, with different values, and world views
(Kalaycioglu, 1998). The Democrats came to power claiming that they represented
"the people as against the bureaucracy (read the state)" (Heper, 1985: 75). On the
other hand the bureaucratic elite viewed the Democrats as a threat to the "very
essence of the Republican values and institutions which they had fought so hard to
build and preserve" (Heper, 1985: 77). They were against DP rule as they argued that
politics was not based on reason under their rule. It was scholars not politicians in
their view who were to direct politics. In various empirical studies carried out among
during the multiparty period suggested "an unwillingness on the part of this [the
bureaucratic] intelligentsia to accept an instrumental polity  with popular sovereignty
as a fact of life" (cited in Heper, 1985: 75). In the exact words of some participated
in the survey "democracy is not a regime where crowds should have a say. It is a
regime of persuasion; however when passions rise, high crowds should definitely be
overlooked" (cited in Heper, 1985: 76). And that "the facts may only be arrived at by
those with education and experience … otherwise ideas in a society would be
extremely chaotic" (cited in Heper, 1985: 76).
According to Karpat, the DP's actions with respect to the military were not
sufficient in themselves to have caused the 1960 intervention. Instead he argues it
was   party politics "were the crucial ingredient in precipitation the army's action.
The RPP did not take kindly to being out of power"  (1988: 139). Besides, Menderes
tried to decrease the role of the military and the bureaucracy and to in his economic
policies instead strengthen the power and influence of the emerging entrepreneurial
groups and that of countryside merchant-landowners. The result was a decrease in
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the purchasing power of the military-civilian bureaucracy. Besides their prestige and
influence also diminished (1988:138-9). According to Karpat (1988: 140),
Menderes had expected the RPP to accept the new leadership developing in
the ruling coalition in the same way that the entrepreneurs, agrarian groups,
conservatists, Muslim fundamentalists, etc. had accepted the leadership of the
secularists, Kemalists, statists, and the military in the past, although they had
held their own views. To Menderes, this was the meaning of democracy. The
Democrats had not, since coming to power, disturbed the foundations of the
republican form of government or sought to destroy the legacy of Ataturk …
Menderes was not prepared for militant opposition from the Republicans …
However, to the new generation of RPP members, the DP ideology and
policies were unacceptable.
After a temporary period of military regime democracy is restored in 1961.
The revolutionary council, the National Unity Committee (NUC), was from the
beginning willing to return power to civilian officials. However the NUC left its
imprint on the political system through the new Constitution. The 1961 Constitution
is prepared by a bicameral Constituent Assembly. One of the chambers was the NUC
itself; thus the military was directly involved in the writing of the Constitution. The
civilian chamber, on the other hand, was far from adequately representing the
society. About a one-third of its members were chosen through indirect elections
while the rest were either appointed or coopted by the two opposition parties (namely
the RPP and the Republican Peasant Nation Party), the Head of the State - who was
also the chairman of the NUC -, the NUC, and institutions such as the judiciary, the
universities, bar associations, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions and
pr ess associations. At first glance the involvement of these associations and
institutions may give the impression that the Constituent Assembly was
representative of various social forces. However, in reality, the Constituent Assembly
dominated by the military, the bureaucracy and the university professors and by RPP
only allowed the representation of the political interests of the state elites. Moreover
the supporters of the ousted party DP - which is said to constitute about half of the
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electorate - were not represented in the Constituent Assembly and were excluded
from the constitution making process (Ozbudun, 1997, 231).
Thus whatever there was civilian in the political atmosphere in which the
Constitution of 1961 was drafted, by and large reflected the political interests of state
elites and supporters of the RPP. The 1961 constitution is generally marked by its
granting of extensive civil and social rights to the individuals by the students of
Turkish politics. However one important feature of the Constitution that stands out
less is its creation of an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of
elected organs. The constitution reflects "a certain distrust of politicians and elective
assemblies". While the 1924 Constitution stated that the nation would exercise its
sovereignty solely through the Grand National Assembly, the 1961 Constitution gave
the executive and the judiciary a share in the exercise of sovereignty. Article 4 of the
1961 constitution specified that the “nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the
authorised agencies as prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution”.
According to Karpat "The Constitution of 1961 was almost exclusively the
work of the RPP" (1988: 142). The Constitution was the product of a thinking that
privileged “the rule of law (read Rechsstaat, or l`etat de droit)” over “the rule of
parliament” (7,1988). It reflected a basic distrust of a general vote and a system
based on political parties alone. Thus the Constitution was so designed that public
authority was derived not from parliament but from the Constitution itself (Heper,
1985: 87). According to Evin (1988: 206):
the 1961 Constitution, which aimed to prevent the state from being
manipulated by politicians, was drafted in such a way as to distinguish and
separate the institutions of the state from the realm of politics. Accordingly,
the office of the presidency was redefined as being above politics and a series
of checks and balances was introduced delimiting the power of the
government over the judiciary, independent organisations such as the
universities and even over the bureaucracy. Such a reorganisation of the
system did not so much aim to 'carve' a distinct arena for the state as it hoped
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to create mechanisms with veto power over the realm of politics. It was
tacitly acknowledged that a cleavage existed between the realm of politics
and that of state.
In the elections of 1961, the JP and the NTP (New Turkey  Party) - the
successors to the DP - together won 238 seats and gained a majority in the Assembly.
According to Karpat, "the voters returned to power the party ousted by the military
on  the previous year" (1988: 143). According to Avner Levi (1991) "the case of the
Justice Party (JP) may conveniently be studied within a framework of centre-
periphery relations" (1991:144).
The JP was anathema to many bureaucratic circles, not because of anything it
had done, but because of what it was - a party based on 'political will' only. It
is uncontroversial to state that, had the JP won the 1961 elections, the military
would not have allowed the transfer of power. Even the fact that it came out
as the second largest party created a crisis. It was obvious to everyone that it
should  not even attempt to form a coalition government without the RPP,
although in the terms of parliamentary arithmetics it could have done so
easily (Levi, 1991: 144).
 W. B. Sherwood saw the JP as the only real grassroots party in the Middle
East with a strong organisation and a large number of active members (cited in Levi,
1991: 146). According to Levi, "the organisation of the JP was a very important
vehicle of social integration. It gave the citizen a kind of protection against the
bureaucrats, it helped him in his personal, economic and even family problems"
(1991:148).
Both the 1960 and the 1980 military interventions were aimed at producing
“sensible politicians”, their "sensibility" defined on the basis of serving the "best"
interests of the country. The obvious goal of the drafters of the 1982 Constitution
was to contain the pluralist thrust of pre-1980 politics. In fact it is commonplace to
think of the 1982 Constitution as a reaction to that of 1961 (Erguder and Hofferbert,
1988: 82). For the drafters of the 1982 Constitution the culprits of the pre-1980
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political polarisation were the politicians who were not able to provide leadership.
Moreover the pluralist aspects of the 1961 Constitution and the electoral system were
also to blame. Thus one basic goal of the 1982 Constitution concerning the political
parties and the party system was to prevent the intensive politicisation of citizens and
groups. This was done by banning the political parties from establishing auxiliary
branches for youth, women and other groups (Article 68). Political parties were also
not allowed to establish clubs, associations, co-operatives, foundations, labor unions,
occupational and professional associations and alike. Neither were they allowed to
form political ties with such existing organisations. Furthermore, article 69 prohibits
political parties from receiving financial aid from such organisations or associations.
Similarly labor unions and voluntary associations are barred from engaging in
political activity, establishing political ties with political parties, and receiving
financial aid from them.
Ilter Turan points out that these laws give the political parties the whole
responsibility for the articulation of the interests in the society, a responsibility that
requires a considerable degree of organisational capacity that the Turkish political
parties lacked at the time. Moreover Turan argues that, in fact “it is a moot point
whether any political party within a democratic system could possess such
capabilities” (1988, 70). He argues that the end-result is that such legal arrangements
create many problems in the operation of a democratic political process as many
interests cannot be represented causing frustrations in various segments of the
society.
With the 1982 Constitution "the executive body no longer draws its authority
from the legislature, but is elevated into a power authorised directly by the
constitution" (Tanor, 1990: 155). Also the executive is strengthened by the increased
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authority of the president, mostly at the expense other legislature (Tanor, 1990: 155).
The 1982 Constitution views the assembly "not as a body where various policies are
weighed and debated and a consensus reached, but rather a 'law-making factory' ''
(emphasis original (Tanor, 1990: 157). Among the three major functions of the
assembly - discussion, supervision and legislation- the latter one is emphasised. Yet,
Tanor notes, even the legislatory powers of the assembly are curbed with the new
Constitution. There are already elaborate regulations in the Constitution on various
subjects which normally would be expected to be dealt with by laws or by-laws made
by the Assembly. Moreover the power of the executive to issue decrees under normal
or emergency conditions has also been expanded. Besides the Constitution made the
amendment of the Constitution difficult by making much of the text immutable
(Tanor, 1990: 157).
In the 1982 Constitution "the political parties are not regarded as channels of
popular participation in the decision-making process, but chiefly, as vehicles
necessary for the achievement of popular consensus and acquiescence to the regime"
(Evin, 1988: 154). According to Evin (1988: 208),
The 1982 Constitution has asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm
of politics and placed constraints on the political system to prevent it from
weakening the control of the state over the governing institutions … The
closing of the major political parties in 1981 and subsequent constraints
placed upon political activity had already signalled that the military took the
business of reducing the impact of political influence seriously).
Binnaz Toprak traces this approach of the drafters of the 1982 Constitution to
the early times of the republic. According to her the state elite always viewed group
solidarity as “a potential cause for the disintegration of the state” (1988, 120).
Neither the existence of ethnic and sectarian groups nor the legitimacy of class
interests was officially recognised for a long time. For her this view is partly a
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remnant of the political legacy of the Ottoman Empire where group solidarity was
viewed with suspicion by the Ottoman bureaucracy as a potential source of
disintegration. The Constitution of 1982 not only strictly regulated the ties between
political parties and interest groups but it also, to a great extent, restricted the basic
rights and liberties of the individuals in the name of national concerns.
As Ozbudun stresses, constitution-making process affects both the mode of
transition to democracy and the prospects of consolidation of democracy later
(1997). If the process allows a lively atmosphere of bargaining, negotiation and
compromise between different groups in the society, the newly established political
institutions will be more likely to be based on wide consensus and to enjoy strong
political legitimacy which will in return increase the chances for the consolidation of
democracy.  Ozbudun regards the Turkish experience in constitution making "as a
series of missed opportunities to create political institutions based on broad
consensus" (1997, 229). According to him, none of the three constitutions drafted
under the Turkish Republic were made by a constituent or legislative assembly that
was representative of different political forces in the society or that allowed for a




Clientelism has been one of the most popular terms in the political science
literature. It has been used in manifold study areas such as exchange theory and
factional systems, and to account for political process and organisation in various
settings ranging from Italy to the Philippines. It has been claimed that although much
of the work on political clientelism grew from the study of "third-world politics, the
analysis of clientelism has proven useful in dealing with European politics, in
explaining factional politics in socialist systems such as China, and in tracing the
historical transition from feudal to class politics" (Schmidt et.al, 1977: ix).
Despite its popularity as a political science term, clientelism does not go
without criticisms. One major criticism has been that the vision of society that the
concept of clientelism bears is that of a highly cohesive and integrated system made
up of relatively harmonious interdependent parts, as a result of which clientelistic
mode of analysis excludes conflict situations and distorts the social reality by taking
harmony for granted (Eagleton, 1976: 103; cited in Lemarchand 1981, 9). Another
criticism was with respect to the perception of clientelism as an autonomous type of
social organisation as opposed to a symptom of class oppression (Flynn, 1974: 139;
Alavi, 1975: 15). Furthermore, various critics questioned the concept's shift from
micro-level to macro-level analysis (Moore, 1974).
Among them, perhaps, that of Gilsenan was the most interesting one.
Gilsenan claimed that the concept of clientelism was abundantly used to refer to
diverse phenomena in diverse social contexts and geographical settings to the extent
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of becoming a catch phrase with little analytical value. Having pointed out that, the
term is used in settings as disparate as Mediterranean politics and New York City
bossism, Gilsenan argues that clientelism (1977: 167)
has become a concept for all seasons, applied quasi-universally to a
multiplicity of relationships in a wide diversity of social and economic
formations. It follows from this confusion that stipulative definitions ('when I
say patron-client ties, I mean …') based as they are on a cobbling together of
'traits' based to an uncertain degree on specific empirical situations, are
inevitably inadequate. They have no real theoretical base and lead merely to
endless additions to or subtractions from various lists of 'characteristics'.
This thesis is an attempt to highlight a weakness of the concept of clientelism
that has not been problematised much yet. We argue that depending on its roots in
the modernisation school's thinking the concept of clientelism, it is loaded with
normative judgments that its definition do not automatically entail such as corruption
and underdevelopment. Thus the concept is used in a vague and arbitrary manner to
the extent of undermining its analytical value. While in one context a relationship or
a political behaviour is identified as clientelistic, in another setting alike relationships
or political behaviors are not labelled as such.
First conceptualisations of clientelism in the 1950s were made on the basis of
a principal assumption that "political loyalties in developing countries cannot
satisfactorily be analysed through theoretical perspectives derived from the historical
evolution of western Europe and North America" (Sayari, 1977: 103). One of the
main political changes that occurred in the Western societies as a result of the
process of their modernisation was the breakdown of vertical hierarchies giving way
to horizontal ties and to the emergence of class or group affiliations as the bases of
political behavior and mass politics in these societies. Political scientists studying the
political organisation and processes in the developing nations in the 1950s and 1960s
took this particular political evolution model in the West as a reference point in their
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analysis. However their class or pluralist group approaches which were developed on
the basis of the political experience of the West were far from being explanatory for
how politics was done in the developing nations where the organisation of political
activity was based dyadically structured systems of political leadership and
followership. Clientelism or patron-client relations as a model was by and large
developed by the students of comparative politics to account for this deviation from
the political association patterns the group theory of politics provided. Thus the
definition of clientelism is initially made with reference to the general characteristics
of traditional societies in mind to conceptualise a modern phenomenon that diverges
from the Western model.
Within this framework clientelism was identified as a feature of the
traditional or transitional societies - that is, in-between societies with modern
institutions but traditional political cultures - that can be and should be eradicated by
social and political modernisation.
This definition was inherent to the concept from its inception in political
science. According to Walston "we define clientelism as being deviant with respect
to an official norm. It can only exist where there is an interplay between two sets of
values" (Walston, 1988: 16). In other words clientelism identified as a valid concept
to the extent that it deviates from official standards of morality. As Walston
acknowledges, "such a definition greatly limits the scope of clientelism as an
analytical tool" (Walston, 1988: 16).
The use of patron-client analysis had been the "province" of anthropologists
for a long time until it was taken up by political scientists to be applied to the study
of the political organisation, political processes and action in developing societies
(Scott, 1977: 92). The origin of the concept in anthropological studies, defined
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initially as a feature of social organisation in feudal settings, further emphasised this
association of the concept of clientelism with "non-modernity".
The argument behind the transportation of the concept of patron-client tie
from anthropological studies to political science was that the patron-client model
which was developed to account for micro-level interpersonal relationship in the
small traditional communities also provided the political scientists with the
conceptual tools they needed in their study of macro-level political behavior and
processes within national institutional contexts of developing societies. The
theoretical basis of this smooth transportation of the concept from micro-level
anthropological studies to macro-level political science studies was provided by one
of the principal assumptions of the modernisation theory, that of the linearity of
development. Since the change is evolutionary on their way to modernity, societies
lose their traditional characteristics gradually. In this respect developing of
modernising societies  are in a sense "transitional" societies, that is "in-between"
societies  with modern institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties but
traditional loyalties and norms cutting across these institutions. Modernisation
theorists studying the political systems of such societies viewed these modern
institutions as facades and what they see as the traditional elements of their political
culture such as personalism, proximity and factionalism as the essential object of
their studies.
Since the existing literature on political clientelism usually views the
phenomenon as a remnant of the feudal past of the society in concern and is bound to
disappear completely with further modernisation or as a reflection of its feudal
relations lingering on behind the facade of modern institutions. Put as such, the
sources for the emergence of political clientelism are not looked for in the
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specificities of current political structures in a society but are thought of in terms of a
feudal-modern axis and rather as a “development” issue.
This thesis is an attempt to point out that the evolutionary modernist
assumptions which lead to the perception of clientelism as essentially a non-modern
phenomenon decreases the concept's analytical value and suggest a new way of
thinking clientelism as a distinct modern relationship the source of which should be
sought in the current political and social structures of a society.
It has already been said that clientelism is now regarded as a widespread
phenomenon existing in divergent settings with various levels of development. The
concept has been applied to numerous research areas and in diverse regions. Turkey
is one of those societies where clientelism has been utilised a great deal in explaining
the dynamics of Turkish politics. It is widely argued that, particularly in politics,
clientelism has become an epidemic, plaguing the political system especially since
the inception of multi-party politics in the country. However a closer look at the
examples of political behavior and processes identified as clientelistic suggests that
this view of clientelism as an essential characteristic of the Turkish political system
may be an exaggeration. Our argument is not that there is no political clientelism in
Turkey. Rather we suggest that the portrayal of particularly Turkish party politics as
predominantly clientelistic may be misguiding.
It is true that there are various instances of clientelistic behavior and activity
in Turkish political life such as the distribution of private benefits, like jobs in return
for votes, the allocation of public resources in a particularistic manner; and nepotism
and favoritism in appointment to bureaucratic posts. Nevertheless, many other
political phenomena that are claimed to be manifestations of clientelism - such as the
high degree of the responsiveness of the political parties in government to the
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demands of their constituents, the role of special groups in the overall decision-
making process; the large role of personal, face-to-face relationships in the political
processes - are not so indeed.
There is almost an unchallenged consensus among the scholars of Turkish
politics that it is the political elite - as opposed to the bureaucratic elite - who is the
chief culprit in this state of events. Political clientelism is perceived to be exclusively
party-directed clientelism in Turkey; studies of political clientelism are
predominantly studies of how politicians and political parties engage in clientelistic
practices in order to get votes and to stay in power. It is true that patron-client
relations is a widespread mechanism for “getting things done” in Turkish political
system. It is commonplace to contact “friends” at critical places in the bureaucracy
particularly if there is need to by-pass the red tape and get a job done faster than it
would normally take if the normal procedure was applied.
The weakness of the accounts of political clientelism in Turkey come to the
fore when specific examples of types of political behavior and activity by politicians,
sections of society with special interests as well as by voters are provided as alleged
manifestations of clientelistic behavior in Turkey. The sources of this weakness is
twofold: one is the arbitrary manner in which the examples of clientelistic political
behavior and processes are identified in the Turkish context; and the other is the
hastiness to label too many political phenomena as clientelistic, particularly
phenomena that are accepted to have legitimate place in other political systems. At
the root of both of these weaknesses lie a feature of Turkish clientelistic perceptions:
the identification of clientelistic phenomena on the basis of not the nature of the
relationships or processes involved but rather on the basis of who the actors of these
relationships or processes are.
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Turkish studies of clientelism are arbitrary in their identification of
clientelism, the context in which a political behavior, relationship or process occurs
or the nature of the political actors involved tends to be more determining in the
identification of a political phenomenon as clientelistic than the nature of the
behavior, relationship or the process itself. The more the political structure or the
political actors involved are associated with the "traditional" as opposed to the
"modern", the more easily the political phenomenon that occurs in that political
structure or that is performed by the political actor in question is identified as
clientelistic. Similarly, if there is no doubt that the political structure or the social
setting and the political actors involved are "modern", then there is less tendency to
look for clientelistic features in it.
A study of the character of constituency service; the range and nature of the
activities of interest groups as well as their relationship with the executive and
legislative bodies in the United States points outs to this arbitrary identification of
clientelistic phenomena in Turkey. Certain political decisions and actions that are
labelled as proofs of clientelism in the Turkish context are identified as regular and
perfectly legitimate elements of the political system when they are experienced in the
American context. They also have a perfectly legitimate role in the overall
functioning of the American political system. The study of these phenomena in the
American context also reveals that the nature of these political activities in the
United States are not in fact very different from the nature of the similar political
activities in Turkey. What makes a particular political behavior, relationship, activity
or process perceived as clientelistic and therefore illegitimate in one country and as
merely a proper part of the functioning of the political system is the other, is not the
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nature of the behavior, relationship, activity or process itself, but the character of the
political actors involved and the nature of the political structure they operate in.
In the United States these activities have a legitimate role in the overall
political structure, whereas in Turkey they are labelled as clientelistic and as
maladies in the functioning of the political system. The political system in the United
States provides legitimate ground for open to influence by interests in the society and
provides legitimate access to specific interests to influence the decision-making
process through pressure groups. American political structure is based on an
acknowledgment that society is made up of groups with special interests and that the
government should be responsive to and representative of these interests. However,
Turkish state is characterised by a tradition of strong state which has always been
suspicious of group solidarities and attempts of social forces to influence the
government. Since the inception of multi-party politics and competitive elections in
Turkey, the "modern" military-bureaucratic elite at the center has struggled to
"prioritise" the "state" at the expense of "politics". In this context various activities of
the political elites to represent the interests of their parties' voters are viewed as
examples of clientelistic phenomena.
This thesis argues that it is the particular state-society articulation based on
the historical cleavage between the "modern" center and the "traditional" periphery
in Turkish politics that creates not only the arbitrary identification of clientelistic
phenomena, but also a misguided perception of clientelism prevailing in Turkish
politics. This nature of the state and center-periphery cleavage, a central historical
feature of Turkish politics nurtures this perception of political clientelism in the
Turkish context. To the extent that clientelism is seen in terms of a traditional-
modern axis and as a "development" issue,  the sources for the emergence of
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clientelism are not looked for in the specificities of current political and social
structures in a society.
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